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6BROKEN BORDERS: DECANAS V. BICA, AND THE STANDARDS THAT GOVERN 
THE VALIDITY OF STATE MEASURES DESIGNED TO DETER UNDOCUMENTED 
IMMIGRATION 
 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
BusinessWeek recently featured a Hispanic family named Inez and Antonio Valenzuela (not their 
real name) in a cover story on illegal immigration. The author (the “Author”) explained that five 
years ago, the Valenzuelas crossed the Mexican border into California with little money, no jobs, 
and lacking basic documents such as Social Security numbers. However, friends and family 
guided the Valenzuelas to the local Mexican consulate, where they each signed up for an 
identification card known as a matricula consular. Next, the Valenzuelas applied to the Internal 
Revenue Service for individual tax identification numbers (ITINs), which allow them to pay taxes 
like any other U.S. citizen. 
 
The Valenzuelas routinely work from four p.m. to two a.m. six days a week at their bustling street 
side taco trailer. In fact, the Valenzuelas’ enterprise is so successful that they bring in revenue 
well above the U.S. household average of $43,000, making them a solidly middle-class family. 
 
Based only on Antonio’s matricula and his Mexican driver’s license, a local car dealer gave the 
Valenzuelas a loan for an $11,000 Ford Motor Co. van. Moreover, Verizon Communications Inc. 
accepted Antonio’s matricula when he signed up for cell phone service. Furthermore, the Wells 
Fargo & Co. branch in the predominantly Hispanic neighborhood where the Valenzuelas live in 
northeast Los Angeles also accepted Antonio’s matricula. In fact, fully 80% of accounts opened at 
the Valenzuelas’ Wells Fargo branch are opened by matricula holders. Wells Fargo branch 
manager Steven Contreraz explained that matricula holders like the Valenzuelas are “bringing us 
all the money that has been under the mattress.” 
 
The Valenzuelas’ Wells Fargo account allows them to pay bills by check and build up their 
savings. The Valenzuelas’ goal is to trade up from a one-bedroom rental to their own home, and 
to eventually expand their business by buying several more trailers.  In fact, the Valenzuelas (ages 
30 and 29), with their two young children (ages 8 and 2 months) in many ways reflect the values 
and ambitions of the 42 million Hispanics in the United States.1
A. THE VALENZUELAS: BOON FOR BIG BUSINESS 
The Author, however, also emphasized that the Valenzuelas are not typical American consumers - 
specifically, the Valenzuelas have lived and worked in the United States illegally since they entered the country five 
years ago.2 And the Valenzuelas are not alone.  “While most analysts peg the number of illegal immigrants [in the 
 
1 Brian Grow, Embracing Illegals, BUSINESSWEEK, July 18, 2005, at 56 (all italicized information in the first four paragraphs is from the 
BusinessWeek cover story). 
2 Id. at 58; The various sources that I cited for this article appeared to use terms such as “illegal(s)”, “illegal immigrant”, “illegal alien”, 
“undocumented alien”, and “undocumented immigrant” interchangeably.  However, no individual source offered a precise definition for their use 
of any such term.  Where I have included a direct quote from a source referencing terms including but not limited to as “illegal(s)”, “illegal 
immigrant”, “illegal alien”, “undocumented alien”, or “undocumented immigrant”, I have left the term used by the source in place.  I believe that 
I risk taking one or more of my sources out of context by trying to apply a more precise definition to terms including but not limited to as 
“illegal(s)”, “illegal immigrant”, “illegal alien”, “undocumented alien”, or “undocumented immigrant”.  Therefore, the use of terms including but 
not limited to as “illegal(s)”, “illegal immigrant”, “illegal alien”, “undocumented alien”, or “undocumented immigrant” shall refer to an 
individual who is in the United States in violation of at least one federal immigration statute.   
7United States] at [ten to eleven] million, [the actual number of undocumented immigrants like the Valenzuelas in the 
United States] could be as many as [twenty] million.”3 In fact, “[s]ince 2000, 1.4 million Mexicans have come the 
to the [United States], and fully 85% of them have entered illegally.”4 Moreover, the 700,000 new undocumented 
immigrants that enter the United States every year is so significant that they represent “one of the nation’s largest 
sources of population growth.”5
Consequently, the Valenzuelas and other undocumented immigrants also represent a large number of 
potential customers that large consumer companies such as banks, insurers, mortgage lenders, credit card outfits, and 
phone carriers feel that they cannot ignore.6 In fact, the Author remarked that “[i]t may be against the law for the 
Valenzuelas to be in the [United States] or for an employer to hire them, but there’s nothing illegal about selling to 
them.”7
Furthermore, the approximately 700,000 new undocumented immigrants that enter the United States every 
year represent a larger source of new consumers for large consumer companies than the approximately 600,000 or 
so legal immigrants that enter the United States every year.8 Additionally, 84% of undocumented immigrants are 
“18-44 year olds, [and] in their prime spending years, vs. 60% of legal residents.”9 The number of undocumented 
immigrants entering the United States on an ongoing basis, and the age of the undocumented immigrants relative to 
their buying power underscores why large consumer companies are coming to covet undocumented immigrants.10 
B. THE VALENZUELAS: MINUTEMAN BORDER ENFORCEMENT COMES TO SAN DIEGO 
Jim Chase, 58, of Oceanside, California is not as likely as large consumer companies to welcome the 
Valenzuelas with open arms.  Chase is a retired postal worker “who participated in the Minuteman Project in 
Arizona in April [2005] but cut ties with its leadership afterward due to personal disagreements . . . .”11 Chase’s 
group, referred to as the “United States Border Patrol Auxiliary, Border Watch, and California Minutemen,” began 
patrolling the border with Mexico in the border community of Campo, outside of San Diego on Saturday July 16, 
2005, bringing volunteers as far as 1,000 miles away from Colorado.12 Chase explained that “I am not trying to look 
for trouble, I am just trying to get the border secured.”13 In fact, Chase commented further that “[i]t’s not about 
immigrants.  It’s about illegal trespassing into the United States.  It’s about [A]l Qaeda.  It’s about drugs.”14 
However, Chase’s group “raised concerns from the U.S. Border Patrol [prior to the patrols] when it urged 
volunteers to bring baseball bats, Mace, pepper spray, and machetes to patrol the border.”15 Chase “toned down his 
Web site, removing items such as machetes and baseball bats from a things-to-bring list, although there [were] still 
instructions listed [prior to the beginning of the Campo patrols] for those who bring firearms.”16 In fact, Chase’s 
comments on the group’s web site emphasized that “I do request . . . anyone with a concealed permit do bring 
 
3 Id. at 58, citing a recent study by Bear Stearns Asset Management (i.e. Robert Justich and Betty Ng, CFA, The Underground Labor Force is 
Rising to the Surface, Jan. 3, 2005, which claimed not only that the U.S. Census does not capture the total number of “illegal immigrants”, but 
that the U.S. Census may be capturing as little as half of the “total undocumented population”.  The authors asserted that “[t]here are many 
ancillary sources of data that provide evidence that the rate of growth in the immigrant population is much greater than the Census Bureau 
statistics.”  Such “ancillary sources include but are not limited to school enrollment, foreign remittances, border crossings, and housing permits), 
available at http://www.bearstearns.com/bscportal/pdfs/underground.pdf.    
4 Paul Magnusson & Ben Elgin, Go Back Where You Came From, BUSINESSWEEK, July 4, 2005, at 87. 
5 Supra note 1, at 58, citing Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics, a recent study by the Pew Hispanic center, a Washington 
think tank, authored by Jeffrey S. Passel, June 14, 2005. 
6 Id. at 58. 
7 Id. at 58. 
8 Id. at 58, citing supra note 5. 
9 Id. at 58, citing id.. 
10 See also, e.g., id. at 56-64. 
11 Leslie Berestein, Border Watch and Protest Peaceful, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 17, 2005, at B1, B7 (the article described the events of the 
very first day that Mr. Chase’s group began patrolling the California-Mexico border in an objective manner.  The article’s author quoted some of 
the participants directly, and it is possible that the newspaper in question could have a bias in favor of or against Mr. Chase’s group.  This source 
may also be inaccurate because they may have portrayed the events that occurred in a manner that emphasized certain events while excluding 
others, which could have served to promote or injure the interests of Mr. Chase’s group). 
12 Id. at B7. 
13 Id. at B7. 
14 Leslie Berestein, Latino Groups Denounce Campo Patrol: Border Watchers to Gather Tomorrow, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., at 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/mexico/tijuana/20050715-9999-7m15border.html (July 15, 2005). 
15 Duncan Mansfield (Associated Press), Fight Against Illegal Workers Spreads in U.S.: ‘Minutemen” Try to Expose Employers in Southeast,
MYRTLE BEACH SUN NEWS, July 18, 2005, at A1. 
16 Supra note 14. 
8weapons.  Many and [a]ll legal weapons to protect the group.  That is your first duty on Minuteman events, to 
protect our people against the monster, should they appear.”17 
Chase’s group of approximately two dozen volunteers was outnumbered by protesters, “some of them from 
as far away as Los Angeles.”18 Standing among the protesters, and holding a sign that read “Nobody is illegal”, 
were cousins Rene Lopez and Matias Rico, both 55 and from Chula Vista, California.19 “We think these Minutemen 
are bullies,” said Lopez, an aerospace engineer.  “The government should patrol the border, not vigilantes.”20 The 
language used by both Mr. Chase and his organization, as well as by persons opposed to Mr. Chase’s group and 
others with the same views illustrates the passion and emotion that has fueled the past and present state efforts to 
deter undocumented immigration that I shall refer to in this article.   
 
C. STATE MEASURES DESIGNED TO DETER UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION, AND THE 
DECANAS TESTS: THE STATES’ RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM, AND THE STANDARD 
AGAINST WHICH THEY WILL BE MEASURED 
 
It is ironic that Minuteman-related citizen patrols of the border have arrived in California.  Ironic because 
California voters enacted the “Save Our State” initiative, otherwise known as Proposition 187, back in 1994.21 
Proposition 187 was an attempt by the state of California to deter undocumented immigration.  However, much of 
Proposition 187 never went into effect because it was invalidated in the federal courts in the years following its 
passage, which I shall also discuss in greater detail in Part III of my article. 
More recently, Arizona voters enacted Proposition 200 in November 2004.22 By passing Proposition 200, 
and as with Proposition 187, Arizona voters enacted a measure designed to deter undocumented immigration.  I shall 
explain Proposition 200 in greater detail in Parts II and III of this article. 
Although Proposition 187 and 200 were passed ten years apart, and although the measures were passed in 
separate states, each of the measures were attacked at least in part in the same manner.  Specifically, opponents of 
the measures argued that each was invalid at least in part because federal law preempted them.  Opponents asserted 
that each of the measures failed to satisfy at least one of the prongs of a three prong test that was set out by the 
United States Supreme Court in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).23 
D. WHY MUST WE DISCUSS STATE EFFORTS TO DETER UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION? 
 The Valenzuelas and undocumented immigrants like them, and their positive and negative treatment by 
different groups in the United States, illustrate the complexity of undocumented immigration in the United States.  
On the one hand undocumented immigrants, as a fast growing segment of the American population, are being 
eagerly courted by groups such as large consumer companies that are seeking their patronage.  However, 
undocumented immigration is being opposed just as emphatically by other groups, particularly by state and local 
governments, whose resources are being taxed more and more by ever increasing numbers of undocumented 
immigrants.  Furthermore, and as I will examine in more detail in Part II of this Article, undocumented immigration 
is such a complex and divisive issue that even the Republican and Democratic parties are conflicted within their own 
ranks about how to properly address it. 
Consequently, state governments, believing that the federal government is not doing enough to deter 
undocumented immigration, are more eager to act to deter undocumented immigration.  Proposition 187 represented 
the first notable attempt by a state to deter undocumented immigration,24 and both the movement that produced 
Proposition 187, and the measure itself illustrate that states have attempted to deter undocumented immigration for 
some time.  
Moreover, undocumented immigration is spreading beyond states that border Mexico, and the spread of 
undocumented immigration has spawned additional state efforts to deter it.25 Proposition 200 represents, just as 
 
17 Id.. 
18 Supra note 11. 
19 Id. at B7. 
20 Id. at B7. 
21 See generally the text of Proposition 187 in Appendix A. 
22 See generally the text of Proposition 200 in Appendix B. 
23 Hereinafter DeCanas test(s). 
24 Karen E. Rosenblum, Rights at Risk: California’s Proposition 187 [hereinafter Rosenblum], reprinted in ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA 
367 (David W. Haines & Karen E. Rosenblum eds., 1999) (asserting that Proposition 187, although much of it was invalidated by the courts in 
the five years that followed its passage, “is nevertheless widely regarded as a watershed in the national consideration of immigration.”) 
25 I shall discuss various measures that state and local governments have taken to address undocumented immigration in Part II of this article. 
9Proposition 187 did, an attempt to change state law through a popular initiative to deter illegal immigration.  Still, as 
I will discuss in more detail later in my article, changing state law through popular initiative is not the only way that 
states can, and nor is it the only way that states are attempting to deter undocumented immigration.26 However, 
analyzing Propositions 187 and 200 serves the useful purpose of illustrating how the DeCanas tests have, and can 
continue to be utilized by opponents of state measures designed to deter undocumented immigration to defeat such 
measures.   
By examining the application of the DeCanas tests with respect to the DeCanas v. Bica case itself, and the 
court cases in which the DeCanas tests were applied to Proposition 18727 and Proposition 200,28 I conclude that 
California’s ACA 6 represents an example of a state measure designed to deter undocumented immigration likely to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny under the DeCanas tests. 
In Part II of this article, I shall first examine how California has been effected by undocumented 
immigration in recent decades, by both state and federal government actions, to illustrate how the movement that 
spawned Proposition 187 arose, and how Proposition 187 came to pass.  I will then further examine how 
undocumented immigration has effected states beyond California since Proposition 187 was passed, and briefly 
analyze efforts in other states since Proposition 187 was enacted in 1994 that have aimed to deter undocumented 
immigration.  Finally, I will paint a picture of the current state of affairs with respect to undocumented immigration 
in the United States to underscore the seriousness of the issue today. 
In Part III, I will examine the facts of and the United States Supreme Court’s holding in DeCanas v. Bica, 
and analyze the reasoning behind the DeCanas tests.  I will then examine the passage of, and the provisions of 
Proposition 187, and further analyze how the United States District Court in California’s Central District 
administered the DeCanas tests in such a manner that significant portions of Proposition 187 were preempted.29 
From there, I shall examine the passage of Proposition 200 in Arizona in November 2004, and explain how the 
United States District Court in the District of Arizona applied the DeCanas tests in denying Proposition 200’s 
opponents’ request for a preliminary injunction. 
In Part IV, I will contemplate how Proposition 200 may withstand scrutiny under the DeCanas tests, or 
how part, or even all of the measure may be preempted by one or more of the tests.  However, I will utilize those 
scenarios, along with my analysis throughout Part III to describe why California’s ACA 6 will withstand scrutiny 
under the DeCanas tests. 
 
II. 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION: FROM CALIFORNIA TO A NATIONWIDE ISSUE 
 
Given California’s proximity to the Mexican border, one can understand why California has experienced 
undocumented immigration.  However, undocumented immigration has continued to spread to states throughout the 
United States, including states that do not line the border with Mexico.30 Therefore, I shall examine how the effects 
of undocumented immigration are being felt by not only states that border Mexico, but states from coast to coast. 
 
A. THE OPENING ACT: CALIFORNIA 
 
I shall utilize Proposition 187 as my first example illustrating application of the DeCanas tests to a state 
measure designed to deter undocumented immigration.  Therefore, I shall begin by analysis by examining the events 
and circumstances that propelled the movement to place Proposition 187 on the ballot, as well as support for and 
opposition to the measure. 
 
26 Specifically, Assembly Constitutional Amendment 6 (hereinafter ACA 6) was an attempt to deter undocumented immigration by amending 
Article XX of the California State Constitution.  However, the measure did not get out of committee, although it may be presented to California 
voters as an initiative in the 2006 elections. 
27 The DeCanas tests were applied to Proposition 187 in two separate court cases: (1) League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 
F.Supp. 755 (1995) (hereinafter LULAC I); and (2) League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F.Supp. 1244 (1997) (hereinafter 
LULAC II).  In fact, the same United States District Court tried both cases. 
28 Friendly House v. Napolitano, CV 04-649 (Ariz. D. 2004), appeal docketed, No. 05-1505 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2004) (hereinafter Friendly House). 
29 Supra note 27, referring to LULAC I and LULAC II. 
30 See generally David Kelly, Illegal Immigration Fears Have Spread, L.A. TIMES, Apr 25, 2005, at A1 (asserting that “Department of Homeland 
Security figures show that from 1990 to 2000, the illegal immigrant population in Alabama grew from 5,000 to 24,000; in Nebraska the number 
grew from 6,000 to 24,000, and in Arkansas from 5,000 to 27,000.”  However, Mr. Kelly did not identify the source of, or which specific 
Department of Homeland Security figures he was referring to).  
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1. PROPOSITION 13: CAUSES AND EFFECTS 
 
Significant demographic shifts that occurred during the 1970s created early rumblings of what resulted with 
Proposition 187 in 1994.  For example, “[b]etween 1900 and 1970 California’s white population dropped from 90 
percent to 78 percent of the total.31 But by 1980 the percentage of whites dropped as much as it had in the century’s 
first seven decades.”32 Therefore, [b]y 1978 [, the year in which Proposition 13 was passed,] more than one in three 
of [California’s] residents was non-white.”33 
Moreover, “Proposition 187 may have been an unanticipated consequence of Proposition 13 . . . [b]ecause 
state taxes and resources were reduced, [which made] redistributive expenditures such as education . . . more 
difficult to fund.  As a result, immigrants were blamed for the economic downturn in California.”34 Moreover, many 
persons on the front lines of government and state services now view the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 as a 
turning point in the disassociation of white society from the growing number of non-whites among them.35 
2. THE 1980’S: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS, THE CALIFORNIA ECONOMY, AND 
THEIR ROLES IN PASSING PROPOSITION 187 
 
Actions taken by the federal government were an additional catalyst for Proposition 187.  For instance: 
In the early 1980s many social programs, such as job training; energy and housing assistance; and 
legal services, that had been funded by the federal government were either cut or reassigned to the 
states.  In the 1990s the impact of these cuts was devastating on poorer communities in states 
[such as California] with large immigrant populations.  Funding for some of these programs would 
now have to come out of the pockets of state residents.  In short, the impact of 1980s federalism 
was taking its toll, further exacerbating relations between residents and immigrants.36 
It is also necessary to understand the conditions in California in the years that preceded Proposition 187 to 
appreciate why the measure came into being, particularly with respect to an economic downturn.  Specifically: 
 
In the 1980s [California] had experienced steady growth, with the addition of 2.6 million jobs and 
an 18 percent increase in real terms of average income per capita. But that had ended abruptly in 
the recession of the early 1990s.  Between 1990 and 1992, 1.5 million jobs were lost [in 
California]; between 1990 and 1993 the official poverty rate [in California] grew from 12.5 
percent to 18.2 percent; by 1993 unemployment was over 9 percent.  By 1993, California was, 
according to some criteria, among the nation’s ten poorest states. 37 
Consequently, factors “including an ailing California economy and an unprecedented budget crunch 
extending over a number of years, an incumbent governor searching for an issue on which to base his re-election 
campaign, and the growing pains of a changing multi-cultural society” all contributed to the introduction of 
Proposition 187.38 Therefore, such factors “helped focus popular concern on undocumented migration from 
Mexico.”39 
3. STIRRING UP A HORNETS NEST: PROPOSITION 187 
 Despite the existence the economic slowdown cited in the previous section, “[o]pponents [of Proposition 
187], particularly ethnic activist and immigrant rights groups, countered that the initiative was nativist, racist, and 
 
31 DALE MAHARIDGE, THE COMING WHITE MINORITY 4 (Time Books 1996). 
32 Id. at 4. 
33 Id. at 4. 
34 LISA MAGANA, STRADDLING THE BORDER: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE INS 53 (University of Texas Press 2003). 
35 Supra note 31, at 4 (contemplating that “[b]y 1978 . . . [w]hites felt an undelying antipathy to what they viewed as a third-world society in their 
midst.  They simply did not want to pay taxes for services that would benefit people different from them”). 
36 Supra note 34, at 53. 
37 Rosenblum, in supra note 24, at 374. 
38 E.g., Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and California’s Proposition 187: The Political Relevance 
and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629, 633 (1995). 
39 Id. at 633. 
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motivated by antipathy toward undocumented Mexicans and, more generally, Mexican-Americans.”40 Specifically, 
“[t]he nativist theme – antagonism to internal minorities on the basis of their ‘foreignness’ and threat to the 
American way of life – was clearly framed in the public statements of proposition drafters.”41 For instance, the then 
media director for Proposition 187 in Southern California expressed: 
 
Proposition 187 is . . . a logical step toward saving California from economic ruin. . . . By flooding 
the state with 2 million illegal aliens to date, and increasing that figure each of the following 10 
years, Mexicans in California would number 15 to 20 million by 2004.  During those 10 years 
about 5 to 8 million Californians would have emigrated to other states.  If these trends continued, 
a Mexico-controlled California could vote to establish Spanish as the sole language of California, 
10 million more English-speaking Californians could flee, and there could be a statewide vote to 
leave the Union and annex California to Mexico.42 
However, “Proposition 187 was also supported by [persons] who believed that [the measure] was race-
neutral.”43 For example, Jesse Laguna, a member of the Save Our State Committee, asserted that Proposition 187 
had nothing to do with race: 
 
If Latinos are caught more often, it is because they illegally cross the border more often.  Most of 
the Angelos I work with on . . . the “Save Our State” Committee would feel exactly the same way 
if the border invaders were Canadians setting up camp in Montana and hollering for freebies.44 
However, even Republican political figures became concerned about Proposition 187’s possible adverse 
effects.  In late 1994, former Republican cabinet members Jack Kemp and William Bennett voiced their opposition 
to Proposition 187 for fear that it would chase Latinos away from the Republican Party.45 Specifically, a “joint 
Kemp-Bennett statement [warned] that Republicans had grown ‘pessimistic, angry, and opposed. . . . The anti-
immigration boomerang, if it is unleashed, will come back to hurt the GOP.’”46
40 E.g. id. at 633 (citing Daniel M. Weintraub, Crime, Immigration Issues Helped Wilson, Poll Finds, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at A1 (reporting 
results of exit polls showing that 78% of those voting for Proposition 187 believed that it "sends a message that needs to be sent" and 51% of that 
group agreed that measure "will force the federal government to face the issue".  Also reporting that exit poll showed that 39% of persons voting 
against Proposition 187, and 18% of the total voters, characterized the measure as "racist/anti-Latino" ); Mr. Johnson also suggested see also 
DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 179 (1984) (analyzing how voters in 
deciding on initiative focus on generalized ideology as opposed to details of measure); Mr. Johnson further suggested see also Fingerhut, Powers, 
Smith & Associates, National Survey of the Attitudes of Hispanic Voters 37-38 (1994) (survey on file with the Washington Law Review) 
(showing that 39% of Latinos surveyed agreed that politicians attacking "illegal immigrants" are "really attacking people of different cultures and 
languages, like people of Hispanic background," that 73% were at least "a little angry" when undocumented workers were attacked for taking 
jobs or causing crime, and that 53% were at least "somewhat sympathetic" toward "illegal immigrants").  Claims of racism were not made 
exclusively by minorities. For example, the President of the American Bar Association stated that California voters endorsed Proposition 187 
"[b]ased on unfounded economic arguments, ugly stereotypes and racial prejudice." Statement by ABA President George E. Bushnell, Jr. on the 
Passage of California Proposition 187, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 9, 1994; additionally, Mr. Johnson also suggested see also Ronald Brownstein & 
Patrick J. McDonnell, Kemp, Bennett and INS Chief Decry Prop. 187, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1994, at A1 (reporting that Bill Bennett and Jack 
Kemp registered opposition to Proposition 187); Ron K. Unz, Experience Reveals No Need for S.O.S., SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 23, 1994, at F3 
(stating opinion of conservative challenger to California Governor Pete Wilson in Republican Party primary that Proposition 187 was 
unnecessary); William J. Bennett, Immigration: Making Americans, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1994, at C7 (arguing against Proposition 187 and 
related immigration measures); Dick Kirschten, Second Thoughts, NAT'L J., Jan. 21, 1995, at 150 (noting concern of business with Proposition 
187).  Mr. Johnson also identified concerns with the political repercussions of being labeled anti-immigrant and anti-minority may prevent a 
Republican-led Congress from proceeding with far-reaching immigration reforms.  Mr. Johnson stated see Marc Sandalow, After Much Ado on 
Immigration, GOP Backs Off, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 13, 1995, at A3. 
41 Rosenblum, in supra note 24, at 371 (quoting such a statement as stating that “[i]llegal aliens are killing us in California. . . .  Those who 
support illegal immigration are, in effect, anti-American.  [Illegal aliens should be] caught, skinned, and fried [because] the people are tired of 
watching their state run wild and become a third world country. . . .  The militant arm of the pro-illegal activists [has] vowed to take over first 
California, then the Western States and then the rest of the nation. . . .  You get illegal alien children, Third World children, out of schools and 
you will reduce the violence. . . .  You’re dealing with Third World cultures who come in, they shoot, they beat, they stab and they spread their 
drugs around in our school system.”  
42 Kevin R. Johnson, Citizens as “Foreigners”, in THE LATINO/A CONDITION 199 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic eds., New York University 
Press 1998) (quoting Letter to Editor by Linda B. Hayes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1994, at sec. 1, p. 18) (emphasis added). 
43 Contra Ruben J. Garcia, The Racial Politics of Proposition 187, in id. at 120. 
44 Contra id. at 120 (citing Jesse Laguna, Latinos Want a Tighter Border Too, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1994, at B7). 
45 Supra note 31, at 172 (explaining that Republicans in the east grew worried about driving Latinos away from the Republican Party, as when the 
party attacked immigrants, pushing several generations of Irish and Italians to the Democratic Party). 
46 Id. at 172, citing Pamela Burdman and Edward Epstein, “Wilson Goes After Kemp and Bennett: Governor Responds to Prop. 187 Attack,” SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 20, 1994. 
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Proposition 187 started with strong support in the opinion polls, and the measure enjoyed a thirty-seven 
point lead among likely voters four months prior to the November 1994 election.47 Ultimately, Proposition 187 
passed with 59 percent of all votes cast.  However, “[e]ven though Latinos were just between 8 to 10 percent of the 
turnout on election day, among all of the four major ethnicities, they were the strongest in opposition.  Exit polls 
showed that Latinos were against the measure by a five to one margin.”48 
B. POST-PROPOSITION 187 EFFORTS TO DETER UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION  
 
Understanding Proposition 187’s effect requires more than an examination of the conditions that led to its 
passage, and the impact of the measure itself.  Therefore, I shall briefly discuss measures passed by other states that 
were similar to Proposition 187, and examine additional actions that California took in response to undocumented 
immigration following Proposition 187.  Furthermore, I shall also discuss federal legislation that was passed after 
Proposition 187 was approved. 
 
1. STATE MEASURES TO DETER UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION FOLLOWING 
PROPOSITION 187 
 
Other states sought to pass measures similar to California’s Proposition 187 in their own states, including 
Florida and Arizona.49 However, California’s attempts to address undocumented immigration did not end following 
passage of Proposition 187.  After the measure was passed in 1994, “California . . . requested aid from the 
government to offset the expenses of supporting illegal immigration, and they sued the federal government for 
funding.”50 Furthermore, California did begin receiving some help from the federal government following 
Proposition 187’s passage. 51 
2. PASSAGE OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO DETER UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION 
FOLLOWING PROPOSITION 187 
 
Proposition 187 also spurred additional action at the federal level.  For instance: 
Proposition 187 was the catalyst for the 1996 welfare reform act [The Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, or the PRA].  Ironically, the 1996 welfare reform, which 
 
47 Rosenblum, in supra note 24, at 373 (explaining that voters appeared to be evenly split on the measure by November.  Still, the measure was 
supported by a majority of the whites, Asian Americans, and African Americans who voted.  In fact, Only eight counties in all of California, all 
of which were in the San Francisco Bay Area, failed to support the measure. Moreover, white voters were disproportionately represented at the 
polls, evidenced by the fact that although 57 percent of California’s population was white, 75-80 percent of the voters were). 
48 Supra note 31, at 262. 
49 See generally DAVID M. REIMERS, UNWELCOME STRANGERS: AMERICAN IDENTITY AND THE TURN AGAINST IMMIGRATION 100 (Columbia 
University Press 1998) (explaining that for example, two separate groups sought to pass measures in Florida analogous to California Proposition 
187. One measure, promoted by a group called Save Our State (based in Orlando and different from the California group of the same name) 
promoted a constitutional amendment to deny schooling and other social services (except medical care) to illegal aliens.  However, fearful that 
the section denying illegal children an education might be unconstitutional, backers scaled back that section, but included other provisions 
requiring state agencies to report suspected illegal immigrants to the federal government.  A second group called themselves Florida 187, and the 
groups was backed by The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). Florida 187 went even further than Save Our State, because the 
group advocated requiring that governmental services be provided only in English, and mandating that public servants pass an English 
proficiency exam.  However, the two groups failed to cooperate with one another, or to gather the necessary number of signatures to qualify for 
the ballot in Florida in 1996.  In addition, Arizona proponents of California’s Proposition 187 were unsuccessful in placing a less stringent 
version on the ballot for their 1996 election). 
50 See generally id. at 101 (explaining, however, that the suit was thrown out after Federal judges ruled that the federal government was not 
obligated to reimburse states for such expenses.  Undeterred, California went to court again in 1996, claiming that the federal government had 
allowed an “invasion” of illegal aliens, and should reimburse California for their expenses, although the suit fared no better than the one that 
preceded it). 
51 See generally id. at 101 (describing that for example in 1995, Congress began to vote funds to help states pay for the expenses of jailing 
criminal immigrants, and California received $270 million of the amount allocated the next year. The amount was four times the amount voted by 
Congress the previous year, and Congress allowed some of the funds to be allocated to counties for the first time.  Then-Justice Department 
Official Chris Rizzuto commented that “[w]e understand that the states, particularly the big states, have a problem and to the degree that the 
federal government can help . . . this is something that can be done.”). 
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was affected by both the [PRA] itself, and the Illegal Alien Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act, was even more broadly cast than Proposition 187.52 
However, “the welfare reform package did not bar undocumented immigrants from public primary and 
secondary education, nor did it require that officials be informed of suspected undocumented immigrants.”53 I shall 
discuss how passage of the PRA impacted Proposition 187’s constitutionality in Part III of this article. 
 
C. THE CURRENT STATE OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
REASONS FOR, AND CURRENT STATE EFFORTS TO DETER THE TREND 
 
1. UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION SPREADS BEYOND THE BORDER STATES 
 
As I stated in my introduction, more and more states beyond those that border Mexico are feeling the 
effects of larger numbers of undocumented immigrants.  Consequently, the increasing numbers of undocumented 
immigrants are having an effect on the economies in those states.  For instance, James Burke, a retired ironworker in 
Cullman, Alabama complained that “the influx of undocumented immigrants working in chicken processing plants 
and construction has led to a rise in crime, decline in neighborhoods, and depressed wages.”54 Mr. Burke further 
stressed that “[o]ur goal is to stop illegal immigration and get rid of the illegal immigrants who are here.  What I saw 
happen in California over 30 years is happening here in just a few years.”55 Mr. Burke added that “[i]f I were to 
break into your house, use all of your stuff, watch your big-screen television, and eat your food, would you say 
“That man is a criminal” or “He just wants to have a better life?”56 
2. HOLES IN THE DIKE: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S FAILURE TO ENFORCE 
EXISTING FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW 
 
The number of undocumented immigrants has increased despite existing federal laws designed to prevent 
that from occurring.  In 1986, The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed, part of which “created 
sanctions prohibiting employers from knowingly hiring, recruiting, or referring for a fee aliens not authorized to 
work in the United States; and increased enforcement at U.S. borders.”57 However, the Author asserted that “[t]he 
[IRCA] may still be on the books, but the feds have almost completely given up on enforcing it.”58 For instance, 
“[l]ast year, the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Agency brought just three actions against companies for 
employing illegal immgrants, down from 417 actions as recently as 1999.”59 
The effect of such lax enforcement is apparent when one considers how dependent some employers are on 
undocumented immigrants.  For example, “[i]llegal immigrants now comprise fully half of all farm laborers 
[nationally], up from 12% in 1990.”60 In addition, “[illegal immigrants are] a quarter of workers in the meat and 
poultry industry 24% of dishwashers, and 27% of drywall and ceiling tile installers [nationally] . . . .”61 
52 Rosenblum, in supra note 24, at 370 (explaining that “[m]ost significantly, [the 1996 welfare reform] denied nonemergency health care and 
public benefits (such as disability benefits and food stamps) to many categories of those legally admitted to the country, not just to illegal 
immigrants.”) 
53 Id. at 370. 
54 Supra note 30, at A1. 
55 Id. at A1. 
56 Id. at A1. 
57 Supra note 34, at 104 (summarizing some of the sanctions created by, and actions taken by the IRCA). 
58 Supra note 1, at 62. 
59 Id. at 62; according to the GAO; compare with George J, Borjas, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 204 
(Princeton University Press 1999) (explaining that “it is no secret that many American employers benefit greatly from the entry of illegal aliens.  
This vast pool of workers lowers wages and increases profits in the affected industries.  Even though it is illegal for employers to “knowingly 
hire” illegal aliens, the chances of getting caught are negligible, and the penalties are trivial.”  The author further explained that “it was not illegal 
for firms to hire illegal aliens until 1988.  Even though it was illegal for those persons to be in the United States, and it was illegal for those 
persons to work, firms were free to fire the illegal aliens.  Since 1988, first-time offenders have been liable for fines ranging from $250 to $2,000 
per illegal alien hired.  Criminal penalties can be imposed on repeated violators when there is a “pattern and practice” of hiring illegal aliens, 
including a fine of $3,000 per illegal alien and up to six months in prison.”)  
60 Id. at 62 (citing a recent Labor Dept. survey, the specifics of which were not provided by the author of the article). 
61 Id. at 62 (citing Jeffrey S. Passel, a Pew senior research associate). 
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3. PERCEPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 
Recent public opinion surveys indicate that many Americans not only oppose undocumented immigration, 
but support how to and how not to address the issue.  Specifically, “[i]n a June 2[, 2005] . . . poll of 900 registered 
voters, fully 79% said they favored stationing the military at the [United States-Mexico] border to stop illegals.”62 
Alternatively, “a mid-May . . . poll of 1,005 adults found 58% disapproving of President Bush’s proposed amnesty 
proposal while just 38% approved.”63 
4. BLACK, WHITE, AND SHADES OF GRAY: DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS DEBATE 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION – WITHIN THEIR OWN PARTIES 
 
Despite the public opposition to undocumented immigration, and even public support for stationing the 
military along the United States-Mexico border to stop it, both Republicans and Democrats are conflicted over how 
to best address undocumented immigration. 
 
a. A GRAND OLD PROBLEM: REPUBLICANS ARE CONFLICTED OVER THE ISSUE OF 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION 
 
Different groups within the GOP, each with different interests, constituencies and agendas, favor different 
approaches to addressing undocumented immigration.  For instance, “[b]usiness-friendly Republicans want to 
satisfy employers’ appetite for low wage labor by passing the [Bush] Administration’s guest worker program.”64 
However, the Republicans’ dilemma is that they “also want to score points for securing the borders against terrorists 
and criminals.”65 Consequently, the Bush White House, while aiming to satisfy Latinos and businesses, is also 
attempting to “mollify a vocal block of cultural conservatives in the GOP . . . who argue that undocumented workers 
present a security threat and take some jobs that could be filled by Americans” by promoting tougher border security 
enforcement.66 However, Wayne Cornelius, director of the Center for Comparative Studies at the University of 
California, San Diego, stated that “[y]ou have the cultural conservatives versus the libertarian, pro-business wing of 
the party.  The cultural conservatives will not let this issue go away.  They will keep holding the president’s feet to 
the fire.”67 
b. WHO DO YOU LOVE? DEMOCRATS’ INDECISION OVER UNDOCUMENTED 
IMMIGRANT WORKERS VS. AMERICAN WORKERS 
 
Democrats are also divided when it comes to addressing illegal immigration.  Michele L. Waslin, director 
of immigration studies at the National Council of La Raza, which favors the Secure America and Orderly 
Immigration Act68, explained that “[t]hese immigrants come to the U.S. to live the American dream, but they’re 
often exploited.”69 Consequently, “[Democrats] are sympathetic to the struggles of immigrants, legal and illegal 
alike, and also wish to retain their edge among Hispanic voters by appearing more welcoming to both groups.”70 
62 Supra note 4 , at 87 (citing a Fox News poll conducted June 2, 2005). 
63 Id. at 87 (citing a NBC/Wall Street Journal poll conducted June 2, 2005). 
64 Compare id. at 87, and Peter Wallsten & Nicole Gaouette, Immigration Rising on Bush’s To-Do List, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2005) at A1, A29 
(hereinafter Immigration Rising) (explaining that [a] guest worker program is favored by many Latinos and by businesses, many of them GOP 
donors that depend on a steady flow of workers from Mexico and other countries” and that “the White House is working with political strategists 
to create a broad coalition of business groups and immigration advocates to back a plan that President Bush could promote in Congress and to 
minority voters in the 2006.”  The coalition is tentatively titled the “Americans for Border and Economic Security”). 
65 Supra note 4, at 87. 
66 Supra Immigration Rising, at A29 (explaining, however, that “[s]ome Republican strategists worry that the more extreme voices among 
[cultural conservatives in the GOP] are alienating Latino voters with anti-immigration language.”) 
67 Supra note 30, at A1. 
68 S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005) (the bill was introduced on may 12, 2005, and states in subsection (a) of Section 111 (“National Strategy for 
Border Security) “ that “in conjunction with strategic homeland security planning efforts, the Secretary shall develop, implement, and update, as 
needed, a National Strategy for Border Security that includes a security plan for the Border Patrol and the field offices of the Bureau of Customs 
and Border Protection of the Department of Homeland Security that has responsibility for the security of any portion of the international border of 
the United States.”) 
69 Supra note 4, at 87. 
70 Id. at 87 (explaining, however, that “Democrats are also mindful that the undocumented compete with legal immigrants for the lowest-skilled 
jobs, often holding down pay.”) 
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D. THE RESPONSE: CONTEMPORARY LOCAL AND STATE EFFORTS TO DETER 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION 
 
1. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
In addition to state governments, local governments from coast to coast have also acted to deter 
undocumented immigration.  For instance, Hudson, New Hampshire Police Chief Richard E. Gendron emphasized 
that “if you want to come to this country, come in the front door.”71 Otherwise, Gendron warned that undocumented 
immigrants caught in his town will be charged with criminal trespass.72 
Furthermore, Robert Vasquez, the Canyon County Commissioner in Idaho, “has sent Mexico an invoice for 
$2 million to cover the cost of caring for illegal immigrants.”73 More recently and significantly, Mr. Vasquez and 
Canyon County have considered attempting to recoup its expenses by “filing a racketeering lawsuit against the 
businesses that hire these workers.”74 The “county’s attempt to recoup its expenses would be filed under the federal 
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, commonly called the RICO Act, which has been used 
against targets ranging from organized crime to Internet spammers.”75 The legal theory may include showing “a 
pattern of immigration violations by employers is costing Canyon County millions of dollars in law enforcement, 
education, and social services.”76
Gendron’s and Vasquez’s actions have been described as representing a “fastspreading grassroots backlash 
whose message to Washington is simple: Seal the borders from illegal immigration, or we’ll take matters into our 
own hands.”77 
2. STATE GOVERNMENTS 
On November 2, 2004, voters in Arizona passed Proposition 200 (i.e. the Arizona Taxpayer and Citizen 
Protection Act).  Consequently, a new section was added to Title 46 of the Arizona Revised Statutes.78 I shall 
explain Proposition 200 in considerable detail in Parts III and IV of this article. 
I shall utilize Proposition 200 primarily as an example of a modern day state effort designed to deter 
undocumented immigration.  However, passage of Proposition 200 did not end state efforts to deter undocumented 
immigration.  For example, Mark Wyland, a Republican member of the California Assembly from Del Mar, 
attempted to amend the California State Constitution to “prevent illegal immigrants from receiving any health care 
or social services not required by federal law.”79 I shall discuss ACA 6 more extensively in Part IV of my article. 
It is necessary to understand and appreciate the passion and emotion, along with the circumstances that 
have spawned both support for and opposition to state measures designed to deter undocumented immigration.  Such 
state measures are attempts by states to address real and tangible problems that they have experienced, and that have 
resulted from undocumented immigration.  However, it is equally important to understand the DeCanas tests 
because states do not have boundless authority to implement any measure(s) that they believe are necessary to 
address their problems.  Moreover, it is also necessary to examine how the legal standard has been applied to state 
measures designed to deter undocumented immigration in the past so that states that are presently contemplating 
similar state measures, or who may do so in the future can anticipate what may be preempted by federal law, and 
what may not be. 
 
71 Id. at 86. 
72 See generally id. at 86 (explaining that Gendron’s officers have already intercepted three Mexicans and four Brazilians during traffic stops who 
were on their way to restaurant and landscaping jobs, and who admitted to being in the United States illegally). 
73 Id. at 87. 
74 Rebecca Boone (Associated Press), Employers of Illegals Could Face RICO Suit, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 17, 2005, at A13. 
75 Id. at A13. 
76 See generally id. at A13 (Such a lawsuit would be the first time that a government has sued a business under RICO, which was enacted in 1970.  
In addition, Chicago attorney Howard Foster, a RICO specialist that Canyon County signed a contract with in early July 2005, further emphasized 
that “[t]here is no such lawsuit in American history.”  However, employers have indicated that the lawsuit could spell the end of many labor-
intensive businesses that rely on immigrant labor, or at least drive up the cost, according to Ann Bates, the executive director of the Idaho 
Nursery and Landscape Association. “We do our best to be sure that they are legal, but the laws restrict you as to what you can ask,” Bates said. 
“We hope that someday somebody really understands that if we lose our labor force, they lose.”) 
77 Supra note 4, at 86. 
78 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-140.01 was added to Article 3 (State Department of Public Welfare) of Chapter 1 (Administrative Agencies and 
Officers) in Title 46 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. 
79 Steve Lawrence, Two Immigration Measures Halted, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 6, 2005, at A4, referring to ACA 6.  
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III. 
DECANAS V. BICA: THE BASIS OF THE DECANAS TESTS, AND THEIR APPLICATION IN LULAC I, 
LULAC II, AND FRIENDLY HOUSE 
 
Analyzing how Proposition 187 was addressed by the United States District Court in California’s Central 
District, and how Proposition 200 has thus far been addressed by the United States District Court in the District of 
Arizona illustrates how subsequent state statutes and other state measures seeking to deter illegal immigration might 
also be affected by the DeCanas tests.  Therefore, one must appreciate and understand the facts and issues in 
DeCanas v. Bica in order to understand how its tests are to be administered. 
 
A. DECANAS V. BICA: THE FACTS OF THE CASE, AND THE ENSUING TESTS 
1. THE FACTS 
The United States Supreme Court considered a California statute that prohibited employers from knowingly 
employing aliens who were not entitled to unlawful residence in the United States if such employment would have 
an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.80 Justice William J. Brennan delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, and explained that “[p]etitioners, who are migrant farmworkers [“Plaintiffs”] brought their action pursuant to 
Section 2805(c) against farm labor contractors [“Defendants”] in California Superior Court.”81 In their action, the 
Plaintiffs alleged “that [the Defendants] had refused [the Plaintiffs] continued employment because of a surplus of 
labor resulting from [the Defendants’] knowing employment, in violation of Section 2805(a), of aliens not lawfully 
admitted to residence in the United States.”82 Consequently, the “[Plaintiffs] sought reinstatement and a permanent 
injunction against [the Defendants’] willful employment of illegal aliens.”83 
However, Justice Brennan explained that “[t]he Superior Court dismissed the [Plaintiffs’] complaint, 
holding that Section 2805 was unconstitutional . . . (because) (i)t encroaches upon, and interferes with, a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme enacted by Congress in the exercise of its exclusive power over immigration . . . 
.”84 The opinion was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, and the Supreme Court 
of California denied review.85 
2. THE MECHANICS OF THE DECANAS TESTS 
a. DECANAS TEST #1: REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION 
Justice Brennan emphasized that “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal 
power.”86 The federal government’s exclusive power to regulate immigration is derived from two portions of the 
United States Constitution.  First, the Constitution grants to the Congress the power “[t]o establish a uniform Rule of 
Naturalization.”87 Moreover, the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
nations.”88 In addition, “the United States Supreme Court has held that the federal government’s power to control 
immigration is inherent in the nation’s sovereignty.”89 
However, Justice Brennan cautioned that “the Court has never held that every state enactment which in any 
way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by this constitutional power, 
 
80 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 352-53, citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (“[n]o employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful 
residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.”)  
81 Id. at 353. 
82 Id. at 353. 
83 Id. at 353. 
84 Id. at 353. 
85 Id. at 353-54. 
86 Id. at 354 (citing Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 23 L.Ed. 543 (1876); 
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 23 L.Ed. 550 (1876); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893)). 
87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (cited in LULAC I, 908 F.Supp. at 768). 
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (cited in id.at 768). 
89 LULAC I, 908 F.Supp. at 768 (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (recognizing inherent power of sovereign 
nation to control its borders); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (“Drawing upon [its Article 1, section 8] power, upon its plenary authority 
with respect to foreign relations and international commerce, and upon the inherent power of a sovereign to close its borders, Congress has 
developed a complex scheme governing admission to our Nation and status within our borders”); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“Our 
cases ‘have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political 
departments . . . .”)) 
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whether latent or exercised.”90 Moreover, Justice Brennan further reasoned that “the fact that aliens are the subject 
of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a determination of who should 
or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”91 Justice 
Brennan further noted that: 
 
In this case, California has sought to strengthen its economy by adopting federal standards in 
imposing criminal sanctions against state employers who knowingly employ aliens who have no 
federal right to employment within the country; even if such local regulation has some purely 
speculative and indirect impact on immigration, it does not thereby become a constitutionally 
proscribed regulation of immigration that Congress itself would be powerless to authorize or 
approve.92
Consequently, the DeCanas v. Bica majority held that “absent congressional action, Section 2805 
would not be an invalid state incursion on federal power.”93 
b. DECANAS TEST #2: CLEAR AND MINIFEST PURPOSE OF CONGRESS TO EFFECT A 
COMPLETE OUSTER OF POWER 
 
Justice Brennan further explained that “[e]ven when the Constitution does not itself commit exclusive 
power to regulate a particular field to the Federal Government, there are situations in which state regulation, 
although harmonious with federal regulation, must nevertheless be invalidated under the Supremacy Clause.”94 In 
fact, Justice Brennan added “even state regulation designed to protect vital state interests must give way to 
paramount federal legislation.”95 The U.S. Supreme Court considered these matters carefully when they analyzed 
whether Congress, by enacting the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), intended to oust state authority to 
regulate the employment relationship covered by Section 2805(a).  However, the DeCanas v. Bica Court did not 
presume “that Congress, in enacting the INA, intended to oust state authority to regulate the employee relationship 
covered by Section 2805(a) in a manner consistent with pertinent federal laws.”96 Justice Brennan emphasized that 
“[o]nly a demonstration that complete ouster of state power including state power to promulgate laws not in conflict 
with federal laws was ‘the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’ would justify that conclusion.”97 Therefore, the 
effect of the DeCanas v. Bica Court’s holding is that Congress ousts a state’s authority to enact a regulation which is 
harmonious with the federal standard only where there is a showing that it was Congress’ “clear and manifest 
purpose” to do so. 
Justice Brennan further clarified that “[o]f course, even absent such a manifestation of the congressional 
intent to ‘occupy the field’, the Supremacy Clause requires the invalidation of any state legislation that burdens or 
conflicts in any manner with any federal laws or treaties.”98 However, Justice Brennan added that:  
 
“[C]onflicting law absent repealing or exclusivity provisions, should be preempted . . . ‘only to the 
extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of’ “the federal law, since “the proper 
approach is to reconcile ‘the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than 
holding (the state scheme) completely ousted.’”99 
90 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355 (explaining that for example, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 415-422 (1948), and Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372-373 (1971) cited a line of cases that upheld certain discriminatory state treatment state treatment of aliens lawfully 
within the United States). 
91 Id. at 355 (explaining that the “doctrinal foundations” of the cases cited by Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 415-422 and Graham, 403 U.S. at 372-373, 
generally arose under the Equal Protection Clause e.g. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927), and that the cases remain authority despite the 
fact that they “were undermined in Takahishi,” see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718-722 (1973); Graham, 403 U.S. at 372-375). 
92 Id. at 355-56. 
93 Id. at 356. 
94 Id. at 356. 
95 Id. at 357. 
96 Id. at 357. 
97Id. at 357 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963), quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230 (1947). 
98Id. at 357 n.5. 
99Id. at 357 n.5 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973), quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 
373 U.S. 341, 361, 357 (1963)). 
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c. DECANAS TEST #3: OBSTACLE TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT AND EXECUTION OF 
THE FULL PURPOSES OF CONGRESS 
 
The DeCanas v. Bica Court explained that “although the INA contemplates some room for state legislation, 
Section 2805(a) is nevertheless unconstitutional [if it] ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress’ in enacting the INA.”100 Or, “stated differently, a state law is 
preempted under the third test if it conflicts with federal law, making compliance with both state and federal law 
impossible.”101 
d. SUMMARY OF THE DECANAS TESTS 
The DeCanas v. Bica holding requires that all portions of a state statute seeking to deter illegal immigration 
must satisfy all three of the DeCanas tests in order for the entire statute to avoid being preempted by federal law.  If 
all parts of a state statute satisfy the first DeCanas test, the entire state statute must then satisfy the second DeCanas 
test, and then the third DeCanas test to avoid having any portion of the statute preempted.  Part of, and even an 
entire state statute seeking to deter illegal immigration is preempted at the point in which such a portion fails to 
satisfy any one of the DeCanas tests (i.e. part or all of a state statute that is not preempted by the first or second 
DeCanas tests may nevertheless be preempted by failing to satisfy the third DeCanas test).  Therefore, state statutes 
seeking to deter illegal immigration must not fail any of the three DeCanas tests or else federal law shall preempt 
part of, or even all of the measure. 
 
B. PASSAGE OF PROPOSITION 187, AND APPLICATION OF THE DECANAS TESTS TO 
PROPOSITION 187 IN LULAC I 
 
District Judge Marianna Pfaelzer, delivering the majority opinion, explained that On November 8. 1994, 
Proposition 187 was passed “by [California voters by a majority] of 59% to 41% and [the measure] became effective 
the following day.”102 However, “[a]fter [Proposition 187] was passed, several actions challenging the 
constitutionality of Proposition 187 were commenced in state and federal courts in California.”103 Judge Pfaelzer 
noted that “[u]ltimately, five actions filed in the United States District Court were consolidated in [the United States 
District Court in California’s Central District] for purposes of motions, hearings, petitions and trial.”104 Judge 
Pfaelzer explained that “[t]he [LULAC I Plaintiffs] have brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to 
bar California Governor Pete Wilson, Attorney General Dan Lundgren, and other state actors from enforcing the 
provisions of Proposition 187.”105 
Consequently, the LULAC I Court entered a temporary restraining order on November 16, 1994 (the 
“Order”).106 The Order enjoined the implementation of Proposition 187’s Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 of (which I shall 
explain in more detail later in Part III).107 The LULAC I Court also granted the Plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary 
injunction (the “Injunction”) on December 14, 1994.108 As a result, the Injunction enjoined the implementation and 
enforcement of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 of Proposition 187.109 
100 Id. at 363 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), Florida Lime & Avacado Growers, 373 U.S. at 141. 
101LULAC I, 908 F.Supp. at 768 (citing Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984); 
Florida Lime & Avacado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142-43 (1963)). 
102 Id. at 763. 
103 Id. at 763. 
104 The five cases referred to as “LULAC I” are as follows: (1) League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, Case No. CV 94-7569 MRP 
(those who brought this action shall be referred to as the “LULAC Plaintiffs”); (2) Children Who Want an Education v. Wilson, Case No. CV 94-
7570 MRP; (3) Ayala v. Pete B. Wilson, Case No. CV 94-7571 MRP; (4) Greqorio T. v. Wilson, Case No. CV 94-7652 MRP (those who brought 
this action shall be referred to as the “Gregorio T. Plaintiffs”; (5) Carlos P. v. Wilson, Case No. CV 95-0187 MRP.  In addition, the City of Los 
Angeles, the California Association of Catholic Hospitals and the Catholic Church of the United States, the California Teachers Association, the 
California Faculty Association, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, the Service Employees 
International Union AFL-CIO, the Islamic Center of Southern California, the Muslim Public Affairs Council, and California Council of Churches 
were permitted to intervene as plaintiffs. I shall refer to those who brought the actions as the “Plaintiffs”, and those whom were the subject of the 
Plaintiffs’ actions as the “Defendants”. 
105 Id. at 763-4. 
106 Id. at 764. 
107 Id. at 764; see generally the specific Proposition 187 provisions referred to in Appendix A. 
108 Id. at 764. 
109 Id. at 764. 
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In addition, “[o]n May 1, 1995 the [LULAC Plaintiffs] and Gregorio T. [Plaintiffs] brought motions for 
summary judgement.”110 The Plaintiffs asserted “that Proposition 187 [was] unconstitutional on the sole ground that 
the initiative [was] preempted by the federal government’s exclusive constitutional authority over the regulation of 
immigration.”111 The “Defendants oppose[d] the LULAC and Gregorio T [Plaintiffs’] motions on the grounds that 
Proposition 187 [was] not preempted [by federal law] and, alternatively, that if any portion of [Proposition 187 was] 
preempted, the remaining portions [would be valid] and must be upheld.”112 
1. CLASSIFICATION OF PROPOSITION 187’S PROVISIONS FOR APPLICATION OF THE 
DECANAS TESTS 
 
Proposition 187 consisted of ten separate provisions when it passed on November 8, 1994.  Among the 
provisions were a preamble (Section 1) and a clause that allowed for proposition 187 to be severed and amended 
(Section 10).  However, Proposition 187 also changed eight different sections of the California Code which were 
disbursed among the Penal Code, Welfare and Institution Code, Health and Safety Code, Education Code, and 
Government Code.113 Therefore, the LULAC I Court divided Sections 2 through 9 of Proposition 187 into the 
following five different classification schemes based on the provisions’ functions, which I shall utilize throughout 
my article: 
 
a. CLASSIFICATION AND VERIFICATION PROVISIONS 
The LULAC I Court identified Proposition 187 “provisions that require[d] [California S]tate officials to 
verify or determine the immigration status of arrestees; applicants for social services and health care; and public 
school students and their parents.”114 Such provisions were further categorized and placed one of the following two 
categories:115 
1. CLASSIFICATION: Such provisions “require[d] [California S]tate agents to classify persons 
based on three state-created categories of “legal status” without any reference to federal 
immigration laws.”116 Moreover, “[S]tate agents [were required to] determine who [was] a 
‘citizen’, and who [was] ‘lawfully admitted’ as a permanent resident or for a temporary period 
of time.”117 Therefore, the classification provisions required State agents to make 
determinations as to one’s “legal status” without reference to federal immigration laws. 
 
2. REMAINING VERIFICATION: Such provisions “contain[ed] a ‘catch all’ category [which] 
exempt[ed] from Proposition 187’s [benefit denial], notification, and reporting provisions 
persons who are otherwise lawfully present in the United States under federal law.”118 
Therefore, the remaining verification provisions represent an effort by Proposition 187’s 
drafters, by exempting persons otherwise lawfully present in the United States under federal 
law from Proposition 187’s provisions, to avoid conflict with federal law under certain 
circumstances. 
110 Id. at 764. 
111 Id. at 764. 
112 Id. at 764. 
113 See generally the specific Proposition 187 provisions referred to in Appendix A (specifically, Proposition 187 Section 2 added Section 113 to 
the California Penal Code; Section 3 added Section 114 to the California Penal Code; Section 4 would have added Section 834(b) to the 
California Penal Code; Section 5 would have added Section 10001.5 to the California Welfare and Institutions Code; Section 6 would have added 
Section 130 to Part 1 of Division 1 of the Health and Safety Code; to the California Penal Code; Section 7 would have added Section 48215 to the 
California Education Code; Section 8 would have added Section 66010.8 to the California Education Code; and Section 9 would have added 
Section 53069.65 to the California Government Code). 
114 Id. at 764. 
115 Id. at 764-5, see generally Sections 4(b), 5(b), 5(c), 6(b), 6(c), 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), 7(e), 8(a), 8(b), and 8(c). 
116 Id. at 765. 
117 Id. at 765; see generally Sections 5(b), 6(b), and 7(d), which the LULAC I Court referred to as the “classification provisions”. 
118 Id. at 765; see generally Sections 4(b)(1), 5(c), 6(c), 7(b), 7(c), and 8(b), which the LULAC I Court referred to as the “remaining verification 
provisions”. 
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b. NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS 
The LULAC I Court also identified “[Proposition 187] provisions which require[d California S]tate 
officials to notify individuals that they are apparently present in the United States unlawfully and that they must 
‘either obtain legal status or leave the United States.’”119 
c. COOPERATION/REPORTING PROVISIONS 
The LULAC I Court further identified “[Proposition 187] provisions which require[d California S]tate 
agencies to report immigration status information to state and federal authorities.”120 Such provisions also required 
California State agencies “to cooperate with the INS regarding persons whose immigration status is suspect.”121 
d. BENEFIT DENIAL 
The LULAC I Court also identified “[Proposition 187] provisions which require[d] facilities to deny social 
services, health care services, and public education to individuals based on immigration status.”122 
e. CRIMINAL PENALTIES PROVISIONS 
The LULAC I Court further identified Proposition 187 provisions that imposed “criminal penalties for 
falsifying immigration documents.”123 
2. APPLICATION OF THE DECANAS TESTS TO PROPOSITION 187’S PROVISIONS 
a. DECANAS TEST #1: REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION 
The Plaintiffs contended that “[Proposition 187] as a whole [was] a regulation of immigration because it 
force[d S]tate employees to make judgements as to an individual’s immigration status, [gave] them the power to 
effectuate removal of immigrants from the country, and thereby establishe[d] California’s own INS.124 Therefore, 
the Plaintiffs argued that because “the entirely of Proposition 187 constitute[d] a scheme to regulate immigration[, it 
was] therefore preempted.”125 
The Defendants countered that “pursuant to DeCanas, ‘regulation of immigration’ ha[d] a ‘narrow, 
technical meaning.’”126 The Defendants further emphasized “that a facial challenge to [Proposition 187] require[d] a 
‘painstaking line-by-line analysis’ of the statute.”127 Consequently, the Defendants asserted that “such analysis 
[would] reveal [] that, standing alone, none of Proposition 187’s individual sections or subsections [were] 
‘essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country and on what terms those 
lawfully admitted can remain here.’”128 
1. HOLDING OF THE COURT 
My analysis will show that the LULAC I Court evaluated Proposition 187’s provisions based on which of 
the five classification groups (described in the preceding section) the LULAC I Court assigned the provision(s) to.  
Consequently, the LULAC I Court determined that the first DeCanas test preempted some of Proposition 187’s 
provisions, while other Proposition 187 provisions were not preempted by the first DeCanas test.  
 
119 Id. at 765; see generally Sections 4(b)(2); (5)(c)(2); and 6(c)(2), which the LULAC I Court referred to as the “notification” provisions”. 
120 Id. at 765. 
121 Id. at 765; see generally Sections 4(b)(3); 5(c)(3); 6(c)(3); 7(e); 8(c); and 9, which the LULAC I Court referred to as the 
“cooperation/reporting provisions”. 
122 Id. at 765; see generally Sections 5(b), 5(c)(1); 6(b); 6(c)(1); 7(a); 7(b); 7(c); 8(a); and 8(b), which the LULAC I Court referred to as the 
“benefit denial provisions”. 
123 Id. at 765; see generally Sections 2 and 3, which the LULAC I Court referred to as the “criminal penalties provisions”. 
124 Id. at 769. 
125 Id. at 769. 
126 Id. at 769.  
127 Id. at 769. 
128 Id. at 769 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355). 
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a. SECTION 7: PREEMPTED BY PLYER V. DOE 
The LULAC I Court analyzed Section 7 of Proposition 187 differently than the remainder of Proposition 
187.  Rather than subject Section 7 to each of the three DeCanas tests, the LULAC I Court considered the impact of 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Plyer v. Doe on Proposition 187’s Section 7.129 The LULAC I Court 
explained that the majority in Plyer v. Doe held “that the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits states from excluding undocumented alien children from public schools . . . .”130 Consequently, the 
LULAC I Court held that “[S]ection 7 in its entirety conflicts with and is therefore preempted by federal law.”131 
b. CLASSIFICATION, NOTIFICATION, AND COOPERATION/REPORTING 
PROVISIONS 
 
The LULAC I Court distinguished Proposition 187 from the statute under consideration in DeCanas v. 
Bica, noting that “the Supreme Court found that [Section 2805(a)] did not constitute an immigration regulation, but 
rather, had only ‘some purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration.’”132 On the other hand, the LULAC I 
court first determined that Proposition 187’s verification, notification and cooperation/notification requirements 
“ha[d] much more than a ‘purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration.’”133 The LULAC I Court further 
emphasized that “Proposition 187’s verification, notification and cooperation/notification requirements directly 
regulate[d] immigration by creating a comprehensive scheme to detect and report the presence and effect the 
removal of illegal aliens.”134 Consequently, the LULAC I Court determined that “Proposition 187’s [verification, 
notification and cooperation/notification requirements] ha[d] a direct and substantial impact on immigration.”135 
The LULAC I Court also noted that “certain of Proposition 187’s provisions require[d S]tate agents to 
make independent determinations of who [was] subject to the initiative’s benefit denial, notification, and 
cooperation/reporting provisions and who may remain lawfully in the United States.”136 The LULAC I Court 
explained that, by comparison, “the statute at issue in DeCanas . . . adopted federal standards to determine whether 
an individual’s immigration status subjected an employer to liability . . . .”137 However, the LULAC I Court found 
that “Proposition 187’s classification provisions create[d] an entirely independent set of criteria by which to classify 
individuals based on immigration status.”138 Consequently, the LULAC I Court held that “the classification, 
notification and cooperation/reporting provisions of [Proposition 187, contained in [S]ections 4 through 9 and in the 
preamble, which [were] aimed solely at regulating immigration, are preempted.”139 
c. BENEFIT DENIAL PROVISIONS 
Unlike their holding with respect to the first DeCanas test and Proposition 187’s classification, notification 
and cooperation/reporting provisions, the LULAC I Court stated that “[Proposition 187’s] benefit denial provisions 
of [S]ections 5 through 8 may be likened to the statute at issue in DeCanas.”140 The LULAC I Court acknowledged 
that “the denial of benefits to persons not lawfully present in the United States may indirectly or incidentally affect 
immigration by causing such persons to leave the state, or deterring them from entering California in the first place . 
 
129 Id. at 774, see generally Proposition 187’s Section 7 in Appendix A. 
130 Id. at 774 (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)). 
131 Id. at 774 (however, the LULAC I Court continued applying the DeCanas tests to Section 7, despite the fact that the provision was already 
preempted by federal law.  I have provided the LULAC I Court’s analysis as it pertains to Section 7 throughout my analysis in Part III.) 
132 Id. at 769 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355). 
133 Id. at 769. 
134 Id. at 769 (noting that “the scheme requires state agents to question all arrestees, applicants for medical and social services, students, and 
parents of students about their immigration status; to obtain and examine documents relating to the immigration status of such persons; to identify 
“suspected” “illegal” immigrants in California; to report suspected “illegal” immigrants to state and federal authorities; and to instruct people 
suspected of being in the United States illegally to obtain “legal status” or “leave the country”). 
135 Id. at 769. 
136 Id. at 769-70. 
137 Id. at 770. 
138 Id. at 770 (referring to Proposition 187’s Sections 5(b), 6(b), and 7(d)). 
139 Id. at 771 (the LULAC I Court examined provision of Proposition 187 individually on ppg. 771-75 when determining whether each provision 
was preempted as a regulation of immigration by the first DeCanas test.  Also, the LULAC I Court mentioned Proposition 187’s preamble 
(Section 1) in this cited quote, but did not provide any specific analysis in the opinion describing the exact basis in which Section 1 was 
preempted by the first DeCanas test.  In fact, the LULAC II Court’s analysis proceeded as if Section 1 had not been preempted in LULAC I). 
140 Id. at 770.  
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. . .”141 However, the LULAC I Court emphasized that “such a denial does not amount to a ‘determination of who 
should or should not be admitted into the country.’”142 
The LULAC I Court stressed that “state agents are unqualified -- and also unauthorized -- to make 
independent determinations of immigration status.  Congress has exclusively reserved that power to the INS and to 
immigration judges pursuant to the INA.”143 The LULAC I Court further explained that “determinations of 
immigration status by state agents amounts to immigration regulation whether made for the purposes of notifying 
aliens of their unlawful status and reporting their presence to the INS or for the limited purpose of denying 
benefits.”144 
However, the Defendants contended “that . . . state agents [were] required to and [did] make determinations 
of immigration status in administering benefits under certain federal-state cooperative program, eligibility for which 
Congress has conditioned on lawful immigration status.”145 Based upon such determinations, Defendants 
maintained that state agents should also be permitted to make such determinations “for purposes of denying benefits 
under Proposition 187.”146 
The LULAC I Court noted the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlement Program (SAVE), “an 
existing federal eligibility system used to verify status for various federal-state cooperative programs . . . under 
which eligibility depends on lawful immigration status.”147 The LULAC I Court emphasized that such benefit 
programs “require[d S]tate agents to verify immigration status by accessing federal immigration status information 
through SAVE.”148 However, the LULAC I Court explained that with respect to administering state-federal 
cooperative programs, “[S]tate agents merely access INS information to verify an applicant’s immigration status -- 
no independent determinations are made are made and no state-created criteria are applied.”149 Therefore, the 
LULAC I Court concluded that State agents, “[i]n administering federal-state cooperative benefits programs . . . 
perform a ministerial rather than a discretionary (emphasis added) function in verifying immigration status.”150 
The LULAC I Court discussed that “[a] requirement that state agents merely verify information status by 
referring to INS information is much different from a requirement that state agents actually make determinations as 
to who is, and who is not deportable under federal law.”151 Specifically, the LULAC I Court contended that 
“[p]ermitting state agents, who are untrained -- and unauthorized -- under federal law to make immigration status 
decisions, incurs the risk that inconsistent and inaccurate judgements will be made.”152 However, the LULAC I 
Court reasoned that “[o]n the other hand, requiring state agents simply to verify a person’s status with the INS 
involves no independent judgement on the part of state officials and ensures uniform results consistent with federal 
determinations of immigration status.”153 
The LULAC I Court concluded that “state regulations implementing Proposition 187 could require state 
agencies to verify immigration status through reference to INS information and could deny state actors discretion to 
apply non-federal criteria for benefits eligibility . . . .”154 Consequently, the LULAC I Court held that “Proposition 
187’s benefit denial provisions [were] not an impermissible regulation of immigration and therefore withstand 
scrutiny under the first DeCanas test.”155 
d. CRIMINAL PENALTIES PROVISIONS 
The LULAC I Court also addressed whether the criminal penalties provisions of Proposition 187 
constituted a regulation of immigration.  The LULAC I Court noted that the criminal penalties provisions, which 
 
141 Id. at 770. 
142 Id. at 770 (citing  DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355). 
143 Id. at 770 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b); 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a)). 
144 Id. at 770. 
145 Id. at 770. 
146 Id. at 770. 
147 Id. at 770 (explaining that SAVE is 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7, and the LULAC I Court specifically cited Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), Food Stamps, Medicaid, and Unemployment Compensation Programs under which eligibility depends on lawful immigration status); 
see 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7(b)(1) and 45 C.F.R. § 233.50 (AFDC); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b-7(b)(2) and 1396b(v)(1) (Medicaid); 7 U.S.C. § 2015(f) and 
42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7(b)(4) (Food Stamps)). 
148 Id. at 770. 
149 Id. at 770. 
150 Id. at 770. 
151 Id. at 770. 
152 Id. at 770. 
153 Id. at 770. 
154 Id. at 770-71. 
155 Id. at 771. 
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“criminalize making and using false documents ‘to conceal’ the ‘true citizenship or resident alien status’ of a person, 
may indirectly affect immigration in some way . . . .”156 However, the LULAC I Court reasoned that “[the criminal 
penalties] provisions, though they may indirectly affect immigration in some way, can hardly be said to be a 
‘determination of who should or should not be admitted in the country.’”157 Moreover, the LULAC I Court asserted 
that “[l]ike the benefit denial provisions, the criminal penalties, criminalizing conduct that is dishonest and 
deceptive, are a legitimate exercise of the police power of the [S]tate.”158 Finally, the LULAC I Court found that 
“[a]bsent the verification, notification, and cooperating/reporting elements of [Proposition 187] . . . the criminal 
penalties do not serve the impermissible goal of ensuring that ‘illegal’ aliens leave the country.”159 Consequently, 
the LULAC I Court held that “[the criminal penalties provisions were] not preempted under the first DeCanas 
test.”160 
b. DECANAS TEST #2: CLEAR AND MINIFEST PURPOSE OF CONGRESS TO EFFECT A 
COMPLETE OUSTER OF POWER 
1. HOLDING OF THE COURT 
The LULAC I Court began its analysis of Proposition 187’s provisions with respect to the second DeCanas 
test by emphasizing that “even if a statute is not an impermissible regulation of immigration, it may still be 
preempted if there is a showing that Congress intended to ‘occupy the field’ which the statute attempts to 
regulate.”161 Therefore, Proposition 187’s provisions were either preempted by the second DeCanas test, or allowed 
to remain in force depending on the purpose(s) of the provision(s). 
 
a. CLASSIFICATION, NOTIFICATION, AND COOPERATION/REPORTING 
PROVISIONS 
 
The LULAC I Court relied upon the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 in 
determining whether part or all of Proposition 187 was preempted by the second DeCanas test.  Quoting Gonzales v. 
City of Peoria, the LULAC I Court noted that “[w]e assume that the civil provisions of the [INA] regulating 
authorized entry, length of stay, residence status, and deportation, constitute such a pervasive regulatory scheme, as 
would be consistent with the exclusive federal power over immigration.”162 Consequently, the LULAC I Court 
concluded that “Congress has fully occupied the field of immigration regulation through enactment and 
implementation of the INA.”163 
Therefore, the LULAC I Court re-emphasized that “the classification, notification, and 
cooperation/reporting requirements contained in Sections 1 and 4 through 9 constitute[d] a scheme to regulate 
immigration . . . .”164 Furthermore, just as the first DeCanas test preempted the classification, notification, and 
cooperation/reporting requirements contained in Sections 1 and 4 through 9 as an immigration regulation scheme, 
“those provisions [were] necessarily preempted under the second DeCanas test as well.”165 
b. BENEFIT DENIAL PROVISIONS 
The LULAC I Court continued by considering whether the second DeCanas test preempted Proposition 
187’s benefit denial provisions.  They noted that the second DeCanas test would preempt the benefit denial 
provisions “only if they regulate[d] a field in which Congress intended a ‘complete ouster’ of state power, even if a 
state regulation in that field [was] not in conflict with federal law.”166 
The LULAC I Court relied upon the DeCanas v. Bica holding to illustrate the limitations of Congress’ 
occupation of the field of immigration regulation.  The LULAC I Court noted that “[i]n DeCanas, the Supreme 
Court defined the field on which the statute in question touched not as the broad field of immigration regulation, but, 
 
156 Id. at 775; see generally Proposition 187 Sections 2 and 3 in Appendix A. 
157 Id. at 775. 
158 Id. at 775. 
159 Id. at 775. 
160 Id. at 775. 
161 Id. at 775 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357). 
162 Id. at 775-76 (citing Gonzales, 722 F.2d 468). 
163 Id. at 776. 
164 Id. at 776. 
165 Id. at 776. 
166 Id. at 776 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356-7). 
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rather, the more narrow field of employment of illegal aliens.”167 Furthermore, “the [DeCanas] Court refused to 
‘presume that Congress . . . intended to oust state authority to regulate the employment relationship covered by the 
[statute]’, and held that the statute was not preempted.”168 Applying that reasoning, and “[f]inding that nothing in 
the INA . . . indicated Congressional intent to preclude state regulation touching on the employment of illegal aliens 
. . . ”, the DeCanas v. Bica Court held that the statute was not preempted.169 
Similarly, the LULAC I Court found that Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions did not touch the 
broad field of immigration regulation.170 Rather, the LULAC I Court found that Proposition 187’s benefit denial 
provisions touched “the public benefits field, specifically alien eligibility for public benefits.”171 The LULAC I 
Court also reviewed the wording and legislative history of the INA, concluding that “nothing . . . ‘unmistakably 
confirms’ an intent to oust state authority to regulate in the public benefits field . . . .”172 Moreover, the LULAC I 
Court, citing DeCanas v. Bica, further reasoned that “such an intent cannot be ‘derived from the scope and detail of 
the INA . . . governing entry and stay of aliens . . . .’”173 Consequently, the LULAC I Court held that “Proposition 
187’s benefit denial provisions [were] not preempted under the second DeCanas test.”174 
c. CRIMINAL PENALTIES PROVISIONS 
The LULAC I Court next considered whether the second DeCanas test preempted Proposition 187’s 
criminal penalties provisions.  The LULAC I Court concluded that the “Plaintiffs made no showing . . . that 
Congress intended to effect a ‘complete outster of state power -- including state power to promulgate laws not in 
conflict with federal laws’ with respect to criminalizing the falsification and use of forged identification 
documents.”175 
The LULAC I Court also determined that “[t]he field on which [S]ections 2 and 3 touch is not the broad 
field of immigration regulation but, rather, the field of criminal law as it relates to false documents.”176 
Consequently, finding that “[s]ince nothing in the legislative history of the INA, or the INA itself, reveale[d] an 
intent to oust state authority to criminalize the production or use of false identification, [S]ections 2 and 3 [were] not 
preempted under the second DeCanas test.”177
c. DECANAS TEST #3: OBSTACLE TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT AND EXECUTION OF 
THE FULL PURPOSES OF CONGRESS 
 
1. HOLDING OF THE COURT 
 
The LULAC I Court began its analysis of Proposition 187’s provisions with respect to the third DeCanas 
test by focusing on the classification, notification, and cooperation/reporting provisions.  In addition, the LULAC I 
Court also considered how the classification, notification, and cooperation/reporting provisions affected the benefit 
denial provisions’ viability.  The LULAC I Court further considered whether the criminal penalties provisions were 
preempted by, the last hurdle that the criminal penalties provisions needed to clear to avoid being preempted by 
federal law. 
 
a. CLASSIFICATION, NOTIFICATION, AND COOPERATION/REPORTING 
PROVISIONS  
 
The LULAC I Court began analyzing whether the third DeCanas test preempted portions of or all of 
Proposition 187 by focusing on the classification, notification, and cooperation/reporting provisions.  The LULAC I 
 
167 Id. at 776 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356-7). 
168 Id. at 776 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356-7). 
169 Id. at 776 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356-7). 
170 Id. at 776. 
171 Id. at 776. 
172 Id. at 776. 
173 Id. at 776 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 359). 
174 Id. at 776. 
175 Id. at 776 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357). 
176 Id. at 776. 
177 Id. at 776. 
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Court emphasized that “[t]he INA specifies an exclusive list of grounds of deportation178 . . . and provides that that 
procedure shall be the “sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien.”179 
However, the LULAC I Court noted that “Proposition 187’s classification, notification, and 
cooperation/reporting provisions directly contradict[ed] the INA’s mandate that the procedure outlined in the INA 
‘shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien.’”180 Moreover, the LULAC 
I Court determined that Proposition 187’s classification, notification, and cooperation/reporting provisions 
“create[d] a new, wholly independent procedure, pursuant to which state law enforcement, welfare, health care, and 
education officials -- rather than federal officials and immigration judges -- were required to determine the 
deportability of aliens, and effect their deportation.”181 By doing so, the LULAC I Court noted that “[Proposition 
187’s] classification, notification, and cooperation/reporting provisions delegate[d] to state agents tasks which 
federal law delegates exclusively to federal agents.”182 Therefore, the LULAC I Court held that “[Proposition 187’s 
classification, notification, and cooperation/reporting] provisions [were] in direct conflict with and [were] preempted 
by federal law.”183 
b. BENEFIT DENIAL PROVISIONS  
 
The Plaintiffs asserted that the “classification provisions define[d] legal immigration status more narrowly 
than federal law, and [that] the remaining verification provisions require[d S]tate agents to classify persons’ 
immigration status based on ‘suspicion.’”184 Therefore, the Plaintiffs argued that Proposition 187’s classification 
and remaining verification provisions “[would] result in the denial of benefits to persons who fail to meet state 
criteria but [were] . . . lawfully present in the United States under federal law.” 185 The Plaintiffs emphasized that 
such a scenario would make it impossible to comply with both state and federal law.  Consequently, the Plaintiffs 
urged that Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions, because of the impact of the classification and remaining 
verification provisions, should also be preempted along with the classification and remaining verification provisions.  
More information regarding the classification and remaining verification provisions with respect to the third 
DeCanas test is in the subsections below. 
However, the “Defendants argue[d] that [Proposition 187] ‘[did] not set up a classification system’ at all . . 
. .”186 The Defendants further asserted “that the classification provisions, like the remaining verification provisions 
which [were] tied to federal standards, should be construed as applying only to persons who are present in the 
United States in violation of federal immigration laws.”187 
The LULAC I Court noted that “Proposition 187 require[d], for the implementation of its benefit denial 
provisions, that public social service agencies, public health care facility personnel, public school districts and 
postsecondary educational institutions classify or verify the immigration status of applicants for benefits and 
services.”188 Therefore, the LULAC I Court considered the effect of Proposition 187’s classification and remaining 
verification provisions on Proposition 187’s denial of benefits provisions.  Consequently, the LULAC I Court’s 
analysis of the benefit denial provisions with respect to the third DeCanas test was tied to Proposition 187’s 
classification and remaining verification provisions.  Therefore, I will examine how the LULAC I Court analyzed 
the benefit denial provisions in conjunction with the classification provisions, and how the LULAC I Court analyzed 
the benefit denial provisions in conjunction with the remaining verification provisions in separate headings below. 
 
178 Id. at 777 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)). 
179 Id. at 777 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (emphasis added) (The LULAC I Court, with respect to the “procedure”, noted that among other things, 
that only a “special inquiry officer” (i.e. an immigration judge) may conduct deportation proceedings (Id); The INA’s accompanying regulations 
require “[e]very proceeding to determine the deportability of an alien in the United States [to be] commenced by the filing of an order to show 
cause with the Office of the Immigration Judge.” (8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)); The authority to issue such orders is delegated to a 
discrete list of federal officers (Id); Only specified federal officials can commence deportation proceedings, and only an immigration judge in 
deportation proceedings can determine that an alien is deportable and order the alien to leave the United States (Id; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), 
1252(b)); Then, after a “final order” of deportation issues, only the Attorney General may “effect the alien’s departure from the United States.” (8 
U.S.C. § 1252(c))). 
180 Id. at 777. 
181 Id. at 777. 
182 Id. at 777. 
183 Id. at 777. 
184 Id. at 777 (for the specific classification and remaining verification provisions, see generally Proposition 187 Sections 4(b)(1), 5(b), 5(c), 6(b), 
6(c), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), and 8(c) in Appendix A). 
185 Id. at 777. 
186 Id. at 777. 
187 Id. at 777. 
188 Id. at 777; see generally Proposition 187 Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Appendix A. 
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1. THE CLASSIFICATION PROVISIONS 
 
The LULAC I Court noted that “Proposition 187 establishe[d] three state-created categories of lawful 
immigration status on which the benefit denial provisions [was] based.”189 However, the LULAC I Court stressed 
that “the [State Categories] . . . fail[ed] to recognize several federal categories of persons who are not citizens, not 
admitted as permanent residents, and not admitted for a temporary period of time but who were nevertheless present 
in the United States . . . .”190 The LULAC I Court further emphasized that persons in the Federal Categories were 
also “authorized to remain in [the United States] and even [to be] eligible for certain benefits in accordance with 
federal law.”191 The LULAC I Court asserted that federal law authorized the persons covered by the Federal 
Categories “to remain in the United States permanently, indefinitely, or temporarily.”192 The LULAC I Court 
concluded that that “[n]one of [the Federal Categories are] accounted for by Proposition 187’s classification 
scheme.”193 
Consequently, the LULAC I Court concluded that the third DeCanas test preempted Proposition 187’s 
classification provisions as used to deny social and health services under Proposition 187 Sections 5 and 6, and 
education under Section 7.194 However, the LULAC I Court also held that the classification provisions could be 
severed from Proposition 187’s remaining provisions.195 
2. THE REMAINING VERIFICATION PROVISIONS 
 
The LULAC I Court determined that “because [Proposition 187 Sections 5(c), 6(c), 7(b) and 8(b)] 
require[d] verification by reference to federal immigration standards, conflict with that law [was] not readily 
apparent.”196 However, the Plaintiffs asserted that:  
 
[T]he verification procedure required by [Proposition 187 Sections 5(c) and 6(c)], based on the 
reasonable suspicion of state agents, [could] not be constitutionally implemented because denying 
benefits to those merely suspected of being present in violation of federal law conflict[ed] with 
federal law which entitles individuals lawfully present in the United States to the receipt of certain 
benefits.197 
In other words:  
[B]ecause benefits [could] be denied under Proposition 187 to individuals who [were] in fact 
lawfully present in the United States if the administering agent merely reasonably suspect[ed] that 
they [were] present in violation of federal law, the verification procedure [in Proposition 187] 
conflicted and impeded the objective of federal law with respect to immigrant benefit eligibility.198 
Therefore, the Plaintiffs urged the LULAC I Court to hold that the third DeCanas test preempted Sections 
5(c) and 6(c). 
 
189 Id. at 777-78 (for the specific classification provisions in question, see generally Proposition 187 Sections 5(b)(1)-(3), 6(b)(1)-(3), 7(d)(1)-(3) 
in Appendix A (i.e. the “State Categories” referred to in the text refers to persons defined as “legal” and entitled to receive benefits if they (1) are 
citizens of the United States, (2) aliens lawfully admitted as permanent residents, and (3) aliens lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time). 
190 Id. at 778. 
191 Id. at 778; see generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157 (certain refugees); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158 (asylees); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) 
(persons granted withholding of deportation); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (parolees); 8 C.F.R. § 242.6 (persons protected by “family unity” status); 8 
U.S.C. § 1254(a) (persons present under temporary protected status); 57 Fed.Reg. 28700-28701 (persons granted deferred enforced departure 
(“DED”); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1105a(a)(3) (stay), 1254(a)(suspension) (persons eligible for suspension or stay of deportation) 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (battered 
immigrant women and children) for information on the persons included in the “Federal Categories”. 
192 Id. at 778. 
193 Id. at 778. 
194 Id. at 778. 
195 Id. at 779. 
196 Id. at 779 (explaining that “[s]ubsection (c) of [S]ections 5 and 6 provides that if any public entity ‘determines or reasonably suspects, based 
on the information provided to it,’ that an applicant for benefits or services is an ‘alien in the United States in violation of federal law,’ the entity 
shall deny the benefits or serices.”  Moreover, “[s]ubsection (b) of [S]ections 7 and 8 likewise calls for verification of status based on federal 
immigration standards by requiring school districts and postsecondary educational institutions to verify that students and/or parents are 
‘authorized under federal law to be in the United States.”) 
197 Id. at 779. 
198 Id. at 779. 
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The LULAC I Court agreed with the Plaintiffs.  The LULAC I Court reasoned that “the only constitutional 
implementation of Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions would [have] require[d] state agents to utilize federal 
determinations of immigration status . . . .”199 The LULAC I Court further held that a “[S]tate agent’s ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ of lawful immigration status [was] not the same as a federal determination of immigration status . . . .”200 
Therefore, the LULAC I Court held that “the ‘reasonably suspects’ language [in Proposition 187 Sections 5(c) and 
6(c)] conflict[ed] with federal law” and was preempted by the third DeCanas test.201 However, the LULAC I Court 
further held that “[t]he ‘reasonably suspects’ language in [Sections 5(c) and 6(c) could] be severed from the 
remainder of [Sections 5(c) and 6(c)].”202 
The LULAC I Court then considered the remaining verification provisions in Proposition 187 Sections 7 
and 8, which pertained to the denial of public education.  In doing so, the LULAC I Court distinguished Proposition 
187 Sections 7 and 8 from Sections 5 and 6 “because public school authorities [would] merely [be] required to verify 
a student’s immigration status as lawful under federal law.”203 The LULAC I Court further distinguished 
Proposition 187 Sections 7 and 8 from Sections 5 and 6 because no “reasonable suspicions” would be involved.204 
The LULAC I Court explained that immigration status could be verified “by reference to INS information . . . 
through programs such as SAVE.”205 Thus, the LULAC I Court held that “the remaining verification provisions in 
[S]ections 7 and 8 [were] not conflict with federal law . . . .”206 Consequently, the LULAC I Court also held that the 
third DeCanas test did not preempt Proposition 187 Sections 7 and 8.207
3. THE BENEFIT DENIAL PROVISIONS CONSIDERED INDEPENDENTLY 
FROM THE CLASSIFICATION AND REMAINING VERIFICATION 
PROVISIONS 
 
The LULAC I Court considered the benefit denial provisions in Sections 5 and 6 together when 
determining whether the third DeCanas test preempted them.  Moreover, the LULAC I Court determined that “the 
benefit denial provisions of [S]ections 5 and 6, even if implemented to deny benefits and services only to persons 
present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws, appear[ed] to conflict with various federal 
laws.”208 Specifically, the LULAC I Court contemplated that the benefit denial provisions of Sections 5 and 6 
appeared to conflict with various federal laws that “applied to federally funded programs and federally funded health 
care facilities . . . .”209 
Therefore, the LULAC I Court held that “[S]ection 5’s benefit denial provisions conflict[ed] with federal 
law as applied to public social services funded in any part by the federal government and made available to persons 
under the authorizing federal statutes regardless of immigration status.”210 However, the LULAC I Court also held 
that “Section 5, to the extent that it denie[d] benefits under wholly state-funded programs and under federal-state 
cooperative programs such as Medicaid, Food Stamps, AFDC, eligibility for which Congress had already 
conditioned on lawful immigration status, [did] not appear to conflict with federal law.”211 Consequently, the 
LULAC I Court made “no determination . . .as to whether [S]ection 5’s benefit denial provision [was] wholly 
preempted.”212 Specifically, the LULAC Court explained that “[a] further showing would be required to reach [that] 
conclusion.”213 I shall explain how this determination was made later in Part III. 
With respect to the benefit denial provisions in Section 6, the LULAC I Court held that “[S]ection 6 must 
be construed to require all publicly-funded health care facilities to deny all medical services, except emergency 
screening and treatment procedures required by federal law, to persons not lawfully present in the United States 
under federal law.”214 The LULAC I Court further held that to the extent that: 
 
199 Id. at 779. 
200 Id. at 779. 
201 Id. at 779. 
202 Id. at 779. 
203 Id. at 779. 
204 Id. at 779. 
205 Id. at 779. 
206 Id. at 779-80. 
207 Id. at 779-80. 
208 Id. at 780 (although the LULAC I Court did not elaborate on which specific “various federal laws” they were referring to). 
209 Id. at 780.  
210 Id. at 782. 
211 Id. at 781-2. 
212 Id. at 782. 
213 Id. at 782. 
214 Id. at 784. 
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[S]ection 6’s [benefit denial provision] applie[d] to facilities that receive federal funding under 
programs such as the Hill-Burton and Public Health Services Act and require[d] denial of non-
emergency medical services to persons unlawfully present where the federal legislation is silent 
with respect to the immigration status of medical care recipients, [S]ection 6 conflict[ed] with 
federal law.215 
However, the LULAC I Court also held that “to the extent that [S]ection 6 applie[d] to wholly state-funded 
health care facilities, if in fact such facilities in fact exist, the denial of non-emergency health services to persons 
unlawfully present in the United States [did] not appear to conflict with any federal law.”216 Furthermore, the 
LULAC I Court also held that although they recognized potential conflicts, “the Court [could] not determine on the 
record before it whether [S]ection 6’s [benefit denial] provision [was] entirely preempted or preempted only to the 
extent that it applie[d] to federal grant recipient health care facilities.”217 
With respect to the benefit denial provisions in Section 8, the LULAC I Court determined that “[the] 
Plaintiffs [did] not identify any provision of federal law that conflicted with [S]ection 8’s denial of education.”218 
Moreover, the LULAC I Court stated that “[o]n its face, [Section 8(a) was] consistent with the INS statement 
permitting aliens ‘considered to be residing permanently in the United States under color of law’ to study within the 
country.”219 Consequently, the LULAC I Court held that “[Section 8(a) was not preempted under the third DeCanas 
test.”220 
c. CRIMINAL PENALTIES PROVISIONS 
The Plaintiffs asserted that Proposition 187’s criminal penalties provisions conflicted with federal law 
because the provisions “imposed different penalties than those already imposed by federal laws regulating the 
production or use of false citizenship, naturalization and alien registration papers and the misuse or forgery of 
passports and visas.”221 However, the LULAC I Court found that despite the differences in penalties, the Plaintiffs 
did not show “that the criminal penalties contemplated by [Proposition 187’s criminal penalties provisions] 
conflict[ed] with or impede[d] the objectives of federal law.”222 Therefore, the LULAC I Court held that 
“[Proposition 187’s criminal penalties provisions were] not preempted under the third DeCanas test.”223 
3. PROPOSITION 187 AFTER LULAC I: SUMMARY OF THE APPLICATION OF THE 
DECANAS TESTS TO PROPOSITION 187’S PROVISIONS 
 
Understanding the impact that the LULAC I Court’s decision had on Proposition 187 requires a brief 
review of how the LULAC I Court’s application of the DeCanas tests impacted Proposition 187’s provisions.  For 
example, the LULAC I Court granted the Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgement with respect to the 
classification, notification, and cooperation/reporting provisions in Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.224 In addition, the 
LULAC I court, because of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Plyer v. Doe, also held that federal law 
preempted all of Proposition 187’s Section 7.  Consequently, federal law preempted Proposition 187’s classification, 
notification, and cooperation/reporting provisions in Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9, as well as all of Section 7. 
However, the LULAC I Court also denied the Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgement with respect to 
the benefit denial provisions in Sections 5, 6, and 8.  The LULAC I Court further denied the Plaintiffs’ motions for 
summary judgement with respect to the criminal penalties provisions in Sections 2 and 3.  The LULAC I Court’s 
 
215 Id. at 784-85 (explaining that the Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 et seq., provides for allocation of federal funds to states for the 
rehabilitation, construction or modernization of public and non-profit hospitals; the Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., makes 
grants of federal funds available to public and nonprofit private entities for projects to plan and develop “community health centers” to serve 
medically underserved populations). 
216 Id. at 785. 
217 Id. at 785. 
218 Id. at 786. 
219 Id. at 786. 
220 Id. at 786. 
221 Id. at 786; see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1306(d) (false alien registration cards); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1424, 1425 (false papers in naturalization 
proceedings); 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (production, possession or use of false identification documents); 18 U.S.C. § 1426 (false naturalization, 
citizenship or alien registration papers); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1542-1543 (forgery or false use of passport); 18 U.S.C. § 1544 (misuse of passport); 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1546 (fraud and misuse of visas); 18 U.S.C. § 911 (false claim to citizenship). 
222 Id. at 786. 
223 Id. at 786. 
224 Id. at 787. 
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holding reflected its findings that none of the three DeCanas tests preempted Proposition 187’s benefit denial 
provisions in Sections 5, 6, and 8, nor the criminal penalties provisions in Sections 2 and 3.  Furthermore, the 
LULAC I Court did not use the three DeCanas tests to examine Section 1 (the preamble) and Section 10 
(severability and amendment provision of Proposition 187), so Sections 1 and 10 were not preempted by any of the 
three DeCanas tests.  Moreover, because the LULAC I Court did not invalidate Sections 1 and 10 for any other 
reasons either, the Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgement were denied with respect to Sections 1 and 10.   
However, the LULAC I Court’s denial of the Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgement with respect to 
Proposition 187’s criminal penalties provisions in Sections 2 and 3; the benefit denial provisions in Sections 5, 6, 
and 8; and Sections 1 and 10 did not mean that those provisions went into effect.  In fact, the LULAC I Court ruled 
that “[t]he preliminary injunction entered by the Court on December 14, 1994, [would] remain in effect until further 
order of the Court.”225 Consequently, Proposition 187’s criminal penalties provisions in Sections 2 and 3; the 
benefit denial provisions in Sections 5, 6, and 8; and Sections 1 and 10 were enjoined. 
 
C. PROPOSITION 187 AFTER LULAC I, AND RELATED EVENTS 
1. PASSAGE OF THE PRA 
After Proposition 187 was passed in 1994, federal legislation was implemented which had a significant 
impact on the provisions of Proposition 187 that survived LULAC I.  On August 22, 1996, President Bill Clinton 
signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (the “PRA”) into law.226 The 
United States District Court in California’s Central District (the “Court”) described the PRA as a “comprehensive 
regulatory scheme for determining aliens’ eligibility for federal, state, and local benefits and services.”227 The Court 
further remarked that the PRA “categorizes all aliens as ‘qualified’ or not ‘qualified’, and then denies public benefits 
based on the characterization.”228 Moreover, the Court stressed that “[i]n the PRA, Congress expressly stated a 
national policy of restricting the availability of public benefits to aliens.”229 
2. OTHER POST-LULAC I EVENTS LEADING UP TO LULAC II 
Passage of the PRA prompted the LULAC I Plaintiffs and Defendants to act to their respective advantages.  
For example, “[o]n November 1, 1996, the Court denied the Plaintiffs’ application for a restraining order against the 
[S]tate’s promulgation of regulations pursuant to the PRA.”230 In addition, “[o]n January 10, 1997, [the 
D]efendants, relying on the PRA, moved for reconsideration of part of the [LULAC I Court’s] . . . decision.”231 
Specifically, “[the] Defendants asked the Court to reconsider only the ‘reporting and cooperation provisions’ . . . and 
[Section] 9 of the initiative.”232 However, the Court denied the motion on March 3, 1997.233 
However, “[o]n March 24, 1997, [the D]efendants brought a motion for partial judgement on the pleadings 
as to [the criminal penalties provisions] of Proposition 187.”234 Consequently, “[t]he Court granted the 
[Defendants’] motion as to [S]ection 2 and denied it with respect to [S]ection 3.”235 In addition, the Defendants 
stated in a status conference in May 1997 that they “[did] not intend to promulgate regulations to implement 
Proposition 187, and wish[ed] for the Court to decide the issues without the benefit of any curative effect the 
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226 8 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2000). 
227 LULAC II, 997 F.Supp. 1244 at 1251. 
228 Id. at 1251 (noting that “Congress defines ‘qualified alien’ as follows: For the purposes of this chapter the term ‘qualified alien’ means an 
alien who, at the time the alien applies for, receives or attempts to receive a Federal public benefits is (1) an alien who is lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1101 ET SEQ.], (2) an alien who is granted asylum under [S]ection 
208 of such Act [8 U.S.C.A. § 11580], (3) a refugee who is admitted to the United States under [S]ection 207 of such Act [8 U.S.C.A § 1157], (4) 
an alien who is paroled into the United States under [S]ection 212(d) of such Act [8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(5)] for a period of at least 1 year, (5) an 
alien whose deportation is being withheld under [S]ection 243(h) of such Act [8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(7)” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)). 
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230 Id. at 1252 (citing LULAC I, 908 F.Supp. 755). 
231 Id. at 1252. 
232 Id. at 1252 (specifically, the Defendants asked the court to only reconsider Proposition 187’s Sections 4(a), 4(b)(3), 4(c), 5(c)(3), 6(c)(3), 8(c) 
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234 Id. at 1252. 
235 Id. at 1252. 
30
regulations might have had.”236 The Defendants’ position reflected their recognition that “California [needed to] 
enact regulations pursuant to the PRA, not pursuant to Proposition 187.”237 
D. APPLICATION OF THE DECANAS TESTS TO PROPOSITION 187’S PROVISIONS IN LULAC II 
 
Following the Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ actions described in the preceding section, the LULAC II Court 
once again examined the provisions of Proposition 187 which survived LULAC I by applying the DeCanas tests.  
As I stated earlier in Part III of this article, the LULAC I court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement 
with respect to the benefit denial provisions in Proposition 187 Sections 5, 6, and 8.  Moreover, the LULAC I Court 
further denied the Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgement with respect to the criminal penalties provisions in 
Sections 2 and 3.  Consequently, although several of Proposition 187 provisions survived the holding in LULAC I, 
those provisions also needed to withstand scrutiny under all three DeCanas tests once again, given the passage of the 
PRA, to avoid being preempted by federal law.  As my analysis will illustrate in the upcoming sections, some of 
Proposition 187’s provisions managed to do so, while others were preempted by the DeCanas tests in LULAC II. 
 
1. THE BENEFIT DENIAL PROVISIONS 
a. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST DECANAS TEST 
The LULAC II Court began their analysis of the benefit denial provisions by again applying the first 
DeCanas test.  However, unlike the LULAC I Court’s analysis the LULAC II Court analyzed the benefit denial 
provisions in light of the PRA.  Nevertheless, the LULAC II Court, as did the LULAC I Court, noted “[t]he federal 
government’s exclusive control over immigration is derived from the Constitution . . . .”238 In so ruling, the LULAC 
II Court emphasized that the federal government’s control over immigration, because it is derived from the 
Constitution, was unaffected by passage of the PRA.239 Therefore, the LULAC II Court held that the first DeCanas 
test still did not preempt Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions. 
 
b. APPLICATION OF THE SECOND DECANAS TEST 
1. BENEFIT DENIAL PROVISIONS IN SECTION 5 AND 6 
The LULAC II Court began its analysis of the benefit denial provisions with respect to the second DeCanas 
test by noting that the LULAC I Court did not preempt the benefit denial provisions in Sections 5 and 6 because 
“[the P]laintiffs had failed to cite any authority that indicated Congress’ intent to completely oust [California’s] 
power to grant or deny aliens public benefits paid for exclusively with state funds.”240 
However, the LULAC II Court asserted that “in enacting the PRA, Congress has made clear that it is the 
immigration policy of the United States to deny public benefits to all but a narrowly defined class of immigrants 
which does not include illegal immigrants.”241 Moreover, the LULAC II noted that “the intention of Congress to 
occupy the field of regulation of government benefits to aliens is declared throughout Title IV of the PRA.”242 
Furthermore, the LULAC II Court emphasized that “[w]hatever the level of government extending the benefits and 
whatever the source of the funding of the benefits -- federal, state, or local -- they are all included within the 
expansive reach of the PRA.”243 Consequently, the LULAC II Court determined that “these provisions both 
demarcate a field of comprehensive federal regulation within which states may not legislate, and define federal 
objectives with which states may not interfere.”244 
236 Id. at 1252. 
237 Id. at 1252. 
238 Id. at 1253 (citing LULAC I, 908 F.Supp. at 770, 772). 
239 Id. at 1253. 
240 Id. at 1254 (citing LULAC I, 908 F.Supp. at 787). 
241 Id. at 1254. 
242 Id. at 1253 (the LULAC II Court did not identify which specific portion(s) of Title IV of the PRA they were referring to). 
243 Id. at 1253 (referring to statements of national policy regarding the denial of public benefits to illegal immigrants (8 U.S.C. § 1601); rules 
regarding imminent eligibility for federal, state, and local benefits, including definitions of the benefits covered (i.e. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621); a 
description of state legislative options in the area of immigrant eligibility for state and local benefits (8 U.S.C. § 1621(d)); and a system for 
verifying immigration status to determine eligibility for benefits and services (8 U.S.C. § 1642)). 
244 Id. at 1253-4. 
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In addition, the LULAC II Court noted that Congress, by passing the PRA, “ousted state power in the field 
of regulation of public benefits to immigrants by enacting legislation that denies federal, state, and local health, 
welfare, and post-secondary education benefits to aliens who are not ‘qualified.’”245 Moreover, the LULAC II Court 
determined that “[f]ederal, state, and local public benefits, as defined in the PRA, include social service and health 
services, which are the same benefits covered by [S]ections 5 and 6 of Proposition 187.”246 
Consequently, the LULAC II Court found that “[b]ecause the PRA is a comprehensive regulatory scheme 
that restricts alien eligibility for all public benefits, however funded, the states have no power to legislate in this 
area.”247 Furthermore, the LULAC II Court held that “states have no power to effectuate a scheme parallel to that 
specified in the PRA, even if the parallel scheme doesn’t conflict with the PRA.”248 
However, the LULAC II Court elaborated that “Congress’ intention to displace state power in the area of 
regulation of public benefits is manifest in the careful designation of the limited instances in which states have the 
right to determine alien eligibility for state or local public benefits.”249 Moreover, the LULAC II Court also stated 
that “Section 1622 provides states with the option of further restricting the eligibility of ‘qualified’ aliens for state 
public benefits.”250 However, the LULAC II Court asserted that because “[t]he PRA defines the full scope of 
permissible state legislation in the area of regulation of government benefits and services to aliens”, states may only 
act pursuant to Sections 1621(d) and 1622.251 
Consequently, the LULAC II Court held that passage of the PRA resulted in the second DeCanas test 
preempting Proposition 187’s benefit denial benefit provisions in Section 5 and 6. 
 
2. BENEFIT DENIAL PROVISIONS IN SECTION 8 
The LULAC II Court remarked that “Section 8 of Proposition 187 denies public postsecondary education to 
anyone not a “citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident, in the United States, 
or a person who is otherwise authorized under federal law to be present in the United States.”252 However, the 
LULAC II Court observed that “the PRA denies federal postsecondary education benefits to any alien who is not a 
‘qualified’ alien.”253 Furthermore, the LULAC II Court reasoned that the PRA “denies state and local postsecondary 
education benefits to any alien who is not a ‘qualified’ alien, a nonimmigrant under the INA, or an alien paroled into 
the United States under [S]ection 212(d)(5) of the INA.”254 Consequently, the LULAC II Court determined that 
“[f]or all practical purposes, the preemption analysis with respect to [Proposition 187’s S]ection 8 is the same as the 
analysis for [Proposition 187’s S]ections 5 and 6.”255 Therefore, the LULAC II determined that “Congress has 
occupied the field of regulation of public postsecondary education benefits to aliens.”256 
The LULAC II Court further noted that on September 30, 1996, “Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (‘IRA’).”257 The LULAC II Court observed that “[t]he IRA 
regulates alien eligibility for postsecondary education benefits on the basis of residence within a state.”258 
Consequently, the LULAC II Court found that “[b]ecause the IRA defines alien eligibility for postsecondary 
education, it also manifests Congress' intent to occupy this field.”259 
Consequently, the LULAC II Court held that passage of the PRA and IRA resulted in the second DeCanas 
test preempting the benefit denial benefit provision in Section 8. 
 
245 Id. at 1254; see generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621. 
246 Id. at 1255. 
247 Id. at 1255. 
248 Id. at 1255 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1642(a)). 
249 Id. at 1255 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), which provides that a state may override the general bar in Section 1621(a) only by enacting a state law 
after August 22, 1996 that provides for state and local benefits to aliens that are “not qualified” under the PRA). 
250 Id. at 1255 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1622). 
251 Id. at 1255. 
252 Id. at 1255; see generally Proposition 187 Section 8 in Appendix A. 
253 Id. at 1256 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1611). 
254 Id. at 1256 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1621). 
255 Id. at 1256. 
256 Id. at 1256. 
257 Id. at 1256. 
258 Id. at 1256 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a)). 
259 Id. at 1256. 
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c. APPLICATION OF THE THIRD DECANAS TEST 
By the time that the LULAC II Court applied the third DeCanas test, the second DeCanas test had already 
preempted the benefit denial provisions in Sections 5 and 6.  However, the LULAC II Court analyzed the provisions 
further to determine if the third DeCanas test also preempted them. 
The LULAC II Court noticed that Proposition 187 and the PRA seemed to apply different standards.  
Specifically, “Sections 5 and 6 of Proposition 187 den[ied] public social services and health benefits to persons ‘in 
the United States in violation of federal law.’”260 Alternatively, “[t]he PRA denies federal benefits to aliens who are 
not ‘qualified.’”261 The LULAC II Court also noted that “[t]he PRA denies state and local benefits to aliens who are 
not ‘qualified’; non-immigrants under the INA; or aliens who are paroled into the United States under [S]ection 
212(d)(5) of the INA for less than one year.”262 
In addition, the LULAC II Court found that “[w]ithout further definition, the terms used in [S]ections 5 and 
6 of Proposition 187, ‘alien in the United States in violation of federal law,” is vague.”263 Consequently, the 
LULAC II Court held that “the term from [Proposition 187 S]ection 5 and 6, ‘alien in the United States in violation 
of federal law”, conflict[ed] with the classifications in the PRA, making compliance with both laws impossible.”264 
Therefore, the LULAC II Court held that the third DeCanas test also preempted Proposition 187 Sections 5 and 6.265
E. PROPOSITION 187 AFTER LULAC II: SUMMARY OF THE APPLICATION OF THE DECANAS 
TESTS TO PROPOSITION 187’S PROVISIONS 
 
The LULAC II Court’s holding invalidated several of Proposition 187’s provisions that survived the 
LULAC I Court’s holding.  Specifically, the LULAC II Court held that the second and third DeCanas tests 
preempted the benefit denial provisions in Proposition 187 Sections 5, 6, and 8.  Consequently, the benefit denial 
provisions in Sections 5, 6, and 8 did not survive LULAC II. 
The LULAC II Court’s invalidation of Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions also affected Section 1 
of Proposition 187.  Although Section 1 survived the LULAC I Court’s holding, the LULAC II Court asserted that 
Section 1 was no longer separately enforceable “[b]ecause . . . Proposition [187] no longer containe[d] provisions 
relating to . . . Section 1 . . . .”266 Consequently, the LULAC II Court held that Proposition 187 Section 1 was no 
longer separately enforceable, and that Section 1 could not be upheld.267 
However, the LULAC II Court did reconsider the Defendants’ motion of March 24, 1997 (“Defendants’ 
Motion”) to grant partial summary judgement on the pleadings with respect to Proposition 187 Section 3.268 The 
LULAC II Court reminded that “the [LULAC I] Court denied [the P]laintiffs’ motion for summary judgement as to 
Section 3, holding that [S]ection 3 was not preempted under the three DeCanas tests.”269 The LULAC II Court 
noted that when Defendants’ Motion was filed, “[the P]laintiffs’ continued to argue that federal law preempt[ed 
S]ection 3.”270 However, after reconsidering the Defendants’ Motion, the LULAC II Court held that “the motion 
should have been granted as to Section 3.”271 Consequently, Section 3 (along with Section 2) survived the LULAC I 
and LULAC II decisions. 
The LULAC II Court also decided upon the validity of Proposition 187’s severability and amendment 
provision (i.e. Section 10).  The LULAC II Court held that “[b]ecause Sections 2 and 3 are enforceable, [S]ection 10 
is also enforceable.”272 Consequently, of Proposition 187’s ten original provisions, only Sections 2, 3 and 10 are 
enforceable following the LULAC I and II holdings. 
 
260 Id. at 1256 (citing Proposition 187’s Sections 5(c) and 6(c)). 
261 Id. at 1256 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1611). 
262 Id. at 1256 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1621). 
263 Id. at 1256. 
264 Id. at 1257. 
265 Id. at 1257. 
266 Id. at 1261 (citing Proposition 187 Section 1). 
267 Id. at 1261. 
268 Id. at 1261. 
269 Id. at 1261. 
270 Id. at 1261. 
271 Id. at 1261. 
272 Id. at 1261. 
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F. PASSAGE OF PROPOSITION 200, AND FRIENDLY HOUSE 
As I mentioned in Part I of this article, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200 on November 2, 2004.  
However, Proposition 200’s passage was far from the end of the story.  Within days of its passage, it was necessary 
for the Arizona Attorney General to issue an opinion as to Proposition 200’s scope.273 Furthermore, Proposition 200 
soon faced legal challenges, one with respect to its scope involving proponents of the measure, and another from 
Proposition 200’s opponents seeking to enjoin its enforcement.   
 
1. PROPOSITION 200’S NUTS AND BOLTS 
As I stated earlier in my article, passage of Proposition 200 added Section 46-140.01 to the Arizona 
Revised Statutes.  Proposition 200 sought “to require employees of the state or local governments to (1) verify the 
immigration status of applicants for state and local public benefits, and (2) report to federal immigration authorities 
any applicant for benefits in violation of federal immigration law.”274 
Proposition 200 further provided that any “[f]ailure to report discovered violations of federal law by an 
employee is a Class 2 misdemeanor.”275 Furthermore, “Proposition 200 includes a citizen-suit provision which 
allows Arizona residents to bring a civil action against any agency or political subdivision for violations of the 
statute’s provisions.”276 
2. THE ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE PROPOSITION 200’S 
SCOPE  
 
On November 12, 2004 the Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard (“Goddard”) issued a ruling in an 
attempt to clarify Proposition 200’s scope.  Goddard stated that “the scope of A.R.S § 46-140.01, as added by 
Proposition 200, is largely determined by the meaning of the phrase ‘state and local public benefits.’”277 However, 
Goddard explained that the prior to the passage of Proposition 200, the “Legislative Council advised voters that 
‘Proposition 200 does not define the term ‘state and local public benefits that are not federally mandated.’’”278 
Therefore, Goddard referred to several sources when making his determination.  For instance, Goddard 
indicated that “[b]ecause of the dominant role of federal law in the immigration area, it is important to consider 
related federal legislation when implementing Proposition 200.”279 Goddard specifically noted that “the legislation 
most directly relevant to Proposition 200 is the [PRA] . . . .”280 
In addition, Goddard also explained that significance of the location of the term “state and local public 
benefits that are not federally mandated” within the Arizona Revised Statutes.  Goddard stated that “Arizona’s 
statutes are divided into titles, each of which is dedicated to a specific subject.”281 Goddard further noted that “the 
drafters [of Proposition 200] placed the portions . . . that concerned state and local benefits in Title 46, which is 
entitled ‘Welfare’ and addresses specific government programs.”282 Goddard also indicated that Proposition 200 did 
not amend portions of other titles within the Arizona Revised Statutes.283 Consequently, Goddard explained that the 
“[p]lacement of [Proposition 200’s provision] governing ‘state and local public benefits’ in Title 46 indicates that 
the statute applies to the programs in that title, but not to programs governed by other titles that comprise the 
Arizona Revised Statutes.”284 
273 The Attorney General’s Opinion was to clarify the scope and meaning of “state and local public benefits that are not federally mandated” as 
applied in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-140.01(A). 
274 Order [Denying Plaintiffs’ Application for Preliminary Injunction] at 6, Friendly House v. Napolitano, CV 04-649 TUC DCB (see generally 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-140.01(A) in Appendix B). 
275 Id. at 7 (see generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-140.01(B) in Appendix B). 
276 Id. at 7 (see generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-140.01(C) in Appendix B). 
277 Attorney General Opinion by Terry Goddard Re. State and Local Public Benefits Subject to Proposition 200, Attorney General at 4, No. I04-
010 (R04-036). 
278 Id. at 5 (citing Arizona Secretary of State, Ballot Propositions and Judicial Performance Review 44 (Nov. 2, 2004) (“Publicity Packet”)). 
279 Id. at 3. 
280 Id. at 3. 
281 Id. at 7. 
282 Id. at 7-8. 
283 Id. at 8 (explaining that “[t]he Proposition did not amend Title 36, which governs public health programs, or Title 1, which establishes 
principles attributable throughout all of state law, or Title 38, which establishes requirements generally applicable to public officers in state and 
local government.”) 
284 Id. at 8. 
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Goddard explained that because Proposition 200’s “state and local public benefits” provisions were limited 
to Title 46, the federal definition of “state and local public benefits” addressed matters beyond the scope of 
Proposition 200.285 For example, “8 U.S.C. § 1621 applies to professional licenses.  But Proposition 200 does not 
alter the screening procedures for applicants for a contractor’s license.”286 Goddard explained that “[t]o do so, 
Proposition 200 should have amended Title 32 (which governs most professional licenses, including those for 
contractors) or some statute that applies generally to all state agencies instead of amending only the statutes that 
govern certain welfare programs.”287 
Consequently, Goddard concluded that “the programs subject to Proposition 200 are those within Title 46 
[of the Arizona Revised Statutes] that are subject to the eligibility restrictions in 8 U.S.C. § 1621.”288 
3. CONFLICTS BETWEEN PROPONENTS OF PROPOSITION 200 
The first legal action taken following Proposition 200’s passage arose between proponents of the measure.  
In fact, “[f]ollowing voter approval of Proposition 200, Anthony D. Rogers, Director of the Arizona Health Care 
Cost Containment System (AHCCCS) requested [Terry Goddard’s Opinion referred to in the previous section].”289 
Consequently, on November 18, 2004, Yes on Proposition 200 filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Maricopa 
County, Arizona.290 Yes on Proposition 200 was joined as Plaintiffs by The Federation For American Immigration 
Reform,291 Randall Pullen,292 Willa Key,293 George Ramoz Childress,294 and Robert K Park295 (collectively referred 
to as the “Plaintiffs”).296 Named in the lawsuit are Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano, Janice K. Brewer, and Terry 
Goddard.297 
The Plaintiffs “sought, among other relied, declaratory and injunctive relief in regard to Attorney General 
Opinion 104-010.”298 On March 14, 2005, the Superior Court ruled in favor of the Defendants.299 Presently, the 
lawsuit is being reviewed in the Arizona Court of Appeals, District One.300 This dispute is presently unresolved, and 
the remainder of my analysis of Proposition 200 in Part III of this article will not focus on this particular dispute. 
 
285 Id. at 11. 
286 Id. at 11. 
287 Id. at 11. 
288 Id. at 11 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1621). 
289 Yes on Proposition 200 v. Napolitano, CV2004-092999 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 2004), appeal docketed, No. CV 05-0235 (Ct. App. Div. 1 Apr. 28, 
2005), from the Web site of the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County, available at 
http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/publicInfo/rulings/rulingsReaditem.asp?autonumb=… (Aug. 5, 2005). 
290 Id.  
291 This organization, also known as “FAIR”, describes itself as “a national, nonprofit, public-interest, membership organization of concerned 
citizens who share a common belief that our nation's immigration policies must be reformed to serve the national interest”, at 
http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_aboutmain (last visited Aug. 10, 2005).  
292 Mr. Pullen is listed as the Chair of Yes on Proposition 200, described on their web site as a “[c]ommittee supporting Proposition 200”, at 
http://www.yesonprop200.com/info/about.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2005). 
293 Willa Key is listed as a “Prop 200/Protect Arizona Now (PAN) spokeswoman” in “Prop 200 Spokeswoman Suggests Boycotting Bank One, 
Other Enablers of Lawbreaking”, THE ARIZONA CONSERVATIVE, at http://www.azconservative.org/Boycott.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2005); 
Protect Arizona NOW describes itself on their web site as “a non-partisan association of Arizonans from all walks of life. We've seen our state 
increasingly burdened by the negative effects of illegal aliens coming to this state against the laws of our country. We the taxpayers have been 
forced to pay for expensive benefits given away to illegal aliens. Often these benefits are denied to our own citizens.”, at 
http://www.pan2004.com/about.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2005). 
294 I was unable to locate any additional information about Mr. Childress. 
295 I was unable to locate any additional information about Mr. Park. 
296 Supra note 289. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. (specifically, “[the] Plaintiffs requested from [the Superior] Court ‘a declaration that the term of ‘state and local public benefits no[t] 
mandated by federal law’ ARIZ. REV. STAT § 46-140.[01] must be declared to apply to all benefits described in 8 U.S.C. § 1621, regardless of 
which particular state or local government agency administers or regulates the provision of such benefits; A declaration that the Attorney 
General’s Opinion is mistaken . . .; and An injunction directing the Attorney General to formally and immediately advise the Governor and all 
appropriate officials of the State of Arizona and its political subdivisions that they are mandated to conduct eligibility verification for appropriate 
benefits . . .” (the “Complaint”)). 
299 Id. (The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking the same relief they set forth in the Complaint, although they additionally requested that 
the court issue “A Preliminary and then permanent injunction in the nature of a special action writ of mandamus requiring the Arizona Attorney 
General formally and immediately advise the Governor – and all of the various officials of the State of Arizona and its political subdivisions that 
the Arizona Attorney General is authorized to advise – that they are mandated to conduct eligibility verification for appropriate benefits and to 
promptly issue regulations and administrative directives in accordance with such advice, in consultation with the Attorney General, and further 
directing that such injunction in the nature of a writ of mandamus if enforceable to the full extent of this Court’s jurisdiction and authority.”  The 
Court held that “[a]s correctly noted by the Defendants in their reply to the Motion to Dismiss the Original Complaint, mandamus may lie to 
compel a public officer to act in a manner involving discretion, but ‘it may not designate how that discretion is to be exercised.’”) 
300 Information found at http://www.cofad1.state.az.us/casefiles/cv/cv050235.pdf  
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4. ACTIONS BY THE OPPONENTS OF PROPOSITION 200 
On November 30, 2004 the Plaintiffs “filed this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 200 
. . . .”301 In addition “to requesting declaratory and permanent injunctive relief, [the] Plaintiffs filed an Application 
for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction” in the United States District Court in the District of 
Arizona to temporarily enjoin Proposition 200’s implementation.302 
In addition to applying the DeCanas tests to Proposition 200, the Friendly House Plaintiffs made, and the 
Friendly House Court also considered other arguments that the Friendly House Plaintiffs made against Proposition 
200.303 However, the upcoming analysis regarding Friendly House shall be limited to that portion of the decision 
that relates to application of the DeCanas tests. 
 
a. PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
 
The Friendly House Court explained that “[t]o obtain a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in the Ninth 
Circuit, the moving party is required to show: (1) a probability of success on the merits combined with a possibility 
of irreparable harm if the relief is denied; or (2) serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tip sharply 
in favor of the moving party.”304
The Friendly House Court concluded that “there are ‘serious questions’ regarding whether or not 
Proposition 200 is preempted by federal law.”305 The Friendly House Court further held that “there are ‘serious 
questions’ regarding whether or not Proposition 200 passe constitutional muster.”306 The Friendly House Court also 
noted that “if Proposition 200 were to become law, it would have a dramatic chilling effect upon undocumented 
aliens who would otherwise be eligible for public benefits under federal law.”307 Specifically, the Friendly House 
Court explained that “an undocumented alien who is eligible for public benefits might refrain from availing himself 
or herself of those benefits out of fear of the implications of Proposition 200.”308 Additionally, the Friendly House 
Court also determined that “the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of [the] Plaintiffs.”309
Therefore, the Friendly House Court held that “[I]t is ordered that [the] Plaintiffs’ Application for [TRO] is 
[granted] and Defendants are temporarily enjoined from implementing Proposition 200.”310 However, the Friendly 
House Court emphasized that “[their] decision to grant the TRO should not be construed in any way as a comment 
on the merits or legality of the Proposition 200 . . . .”311 
b. PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
 
The Friendly House Court stated that “[t]o obtain a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit, the moving 
party is required to show: (1) a probability of success on the merits combined with a possibility of irreparable harm 
if the relief is denied; or (2) serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tip sharply in favor of the 
moving party.”312 The Friendly House Court also emphasized the necessity of utilizing the DeCanas tests to 
determine whether Proposition 200 was preempted by federal law. 
 
301 Supra note 28, in Defendants’ Answering Brief at 2, Friendly House v. Napolitano, CV 04-649 (Ariz. D. 2004), appeal docketed, No. 05-1505 
(9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2004). 
302 Id. at 2 (I shall refer to the Plaintiffs in the present case as the “Friendly House Plaintiffs” throughout this Article). 
303 Specifically, the Friendly House Plaintiffs argued that Proposition 200 was invalid in two other ways: (1)The Plaintiffs argued that Proposition 
200, as it was drafted and before it was implemented, was unconstitutionally vague and amounted to a violation of the due process rights of 
Plaintiffs who are or may be applicants for State and local public benefits; (2) With respect to State and local officials, the Plaintiffs claimed that 
Proposition 200 is impermissibly vague because it failed to set forth a culpable mental state for failure to report discovered violations of federal 
immigration law.  However, neither argument resulted in the Friendly House Court granting the Friendly House Plaintiffs’ request for a 
preliminary injunction. 
304 Order [Granting Plaintiffs’ Application for Temporary Restraining Order] at 2, Friendly House v. Napolitano, CV 04-649 TUC DCB (citing 
Tillamook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 288 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
305 Id. at 2. 
306 Id. at 2. 
307 Id. at 2. 
308 Id. at 2. 
309 Id. at 2. 
310 Id. at 3. 
311 Id. at 3. 
312 Supra note 274, at 2 (this is the same test that was applied when the Friendly House Court considered the Plaintiffs’ request for a TRO). 
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1. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST DECANAS TEST 
The Friendly House Court articulated that “in DeCanas, the Supreme Court held that a California statute 
which prohibited employers from knowingly employing aliens not entitled to legal residence in the United States if 
such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers was not preempted by federal law.”313 
However, referring to the District Court in the Eastern District of Virginia (the “District Court”), the Friendly House 
Court emphasized that “[e]ssential to the DeCanas decision is the fact that the California statute adopted federal 
standards, thus saving it from becoming a ‘constitutionally proscribed regulation of immigration that Congress itself 
would be powerless to authorize or approve.’”314 The District Court further elaborated that: 
 
[I]t is the creation of standards for determining who is and is not in this country legally that 
constitutes a regulation of immigration in these circumstances, not whether a state’s determination 
in this regard results in the actual removal or inadmissibility of any particular alien, for the 
standards themselves are a “determination of who should or should not be admitted into the 
country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.315 
Consequently, the Friendly House Court determined that “under the first DeCanas test, there is no 
preemption under the Supremacy Clause of Proposition 200’s denial of public benefits to ineligible aliens, provided 
that in doing so, the agencies implementing the law adopt federal standards, or instead create standards different 
from, or in excess of federal standards.”316 In fact, the Friendly House Court stated that “if the latter was true, 
Proposition 200 may be preempted by the Supremacy Clause.”317 
a. IMPACT OF THE PRA IN THE PRESENT CASE 
The Friendly House Court stated that “[u]nder the PRA, a State or political subdivision of a State is not 
required to adopt any particular eligibility criteria for state-funded programs.”318 Rather:  
 
If a State chooses to follow the Federal classification in determining the eligibility of qualified 
aliens for public benefits, that State “shall be considered to have chosen the least restrictive means 
available for achieving the compelling government interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in 
accordance with national immigration policy.319 
In addition, the Friendly House Court contended that “under the PRA, ‘a State or political subdivision of a 
State is authorized to prohibit or otherwise restrict the eligibility of aliens or classes of aliens for programs of 
general cash public assistance furnished under the law of the State or political subdivision of a State.’”320 However, 
the Friendly House Court cautioned that the “authority . . . is limited, and ‘may be exercised only to the extent that 
any prohibitions, limitations, or restrictions imposed by a State or political subdivision of a State are not more 
restrictive than the prohibitions, limitations, or restrictions imposed under comparable Federal programs.’”321 In 
other words, “under the PRA, a state is authorized to impose limitations on the eligibility of qualified aliens for 
 
313 Id. at 9 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 353). 
314 Id. at 10 (citing Equal Access to Education v. Merten (hereinafter Merten I), 305 F.Supp.2d 585, 602 (E.D. Va. 2004), quoting DeCanas, 424 
U.S. at 356)(emphasis original)). 
315 Id. at 10 (citing Merten I, 305 F.Supp.2d at 602-03, quoting DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355). 
316 Id. at 10. 
317 Id. at 10. 
318 Id. at 10; see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (explaining that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in subsection 
(b) of this section, a State is authorized to determine the eligibility for any State public benefits of an alien who is a qualified alien (as defined in 
section 1641 of this title), a non-immigrant under the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.] or an alien who is paroled into 
the United States under section 212(d)(5) of such Act [8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(5)] for less than one year”). 
319 Id. at 10, see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (commenting that “[w]ith respect to the State authority to make determinations concerning the 
eligibility of qualified aliens for public benefits in this chapter, a State that chooses to follow the Federal classification in determining the 
eligibility of such aliens for public assistance shall be considered to have chosen the least restrictive means available for achieving the compelling 
governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national immigration policy”). 
320 Id. at 10 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1624(a)). 
321 Id. at 10-11 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1624(b)). 
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State-funded welfare benefits, so long as such limitations are not more restrictive than comparable Federal 
limitations.”322 
However, the Friendly House Court noted that “Congress clearly intended that State and local governments 
would insure that illegal aliens not receive public benefits.”323 The Friendly House Court noted that the Congress, in 
a Conference Report, explained that:  
 
No current state law, State constitutional provision, State executive order or decision of any State 
or Federal Court shall provide a sufficient basis for a State to be relieved of the requirement to 
deny benefits to illegal aliens. Laws, ordinances, or executive orders passed by county, city, or 
other local officials will not allow those entities to provide benefits to illegal aliens.  Only the 
affirmative enactment of a law by a State legislature and signed by the Governor after the date of 
enactment of this Act, that references this provision, will meet the requirements of this section.324 
b. PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENTS, AND DETERMINATIONS OF THE 
FRIENDLY HOUSE COURT 
 
The Plaintiffs asserted that “no express provision in the PRA . . . requires State or local agents to notify 
federal immigration authorities of alleged violations of federal immigration law.”325 Consequently, the Plaintiffs 
contended that “Proposition 200’s reporting provision conflicts with federal law and establishes a standard by 
which State and local officials determine who is and who is not lawfully in this country.”326 Therefore, the 
Plaintiffs argued that Proposition 200” reporting provision was a regulation of immigration, and thus is preempted 
by the first DeCanas test.327 
However, the Friendly House Court explained that the “PRA  . . . expressly remove[s] any prohibitions and 
restrictions against any State or local government entity ‘from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United 
States.’”328 The Friendly House Court also explained that “[b]y removing all such prohibitions and restrictions, 
Congress fully intended that State and local governments should communicate with federal authorities regarding an 
alien’s immigration status.”329 In fact, the Friendly House Court elaborated that “[i]ndeed, by removing all such 
restrictions, Congress encourages such communication.”330 In support of its holding, The Friendly House Court 
relied upon a Conference Report, which explained that:  
 
The conferees intend to give State and local officials the authority to communicate with the INS 
regarding the presence, whereabouts, or activities of illegal aliens.  This provision is designed to 
prevent any State or local law, ordinance, executive order, policy, constitutional provision, or 
decision of any Federal or State court that prohibits or in any way restricts any communication 
between State and local officials and the INS.  The conferees believe that immigration law 
enforcement is as high a priority as other aspects of Federal law enforcement, and that illegal 
aliens do not have the right to remain in the United States undetected and unapprehended.331 
In addition, the Friendly House Court noted that “Congress may not directly compel states or localities to 
enact or administer federal programs or policies.”332 
However, the Friendly House Court further noted that the reporting provisions in the Act present a potential 
problem, in “that State or local officials ‘cannot assume that an alien who admits he lacks proper documentation has 
violated’ federal immigration law.”333 However, the Friendly House Court determined that “the court in Gonzalez 
322 Id. at 11 (citing Doe v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 406 n.3 (Mass. 2002)). 
323 Id. at 12. 
324 Id. at 12 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725, at 383 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2771 (emphasis added)). 
325 Id. at 12. 
326 Id. at 12. 
327 Id. at 12. 
328 Id. at 13 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1644). 
329 Id. at 13. 
330 Id. at 13. 
331 Id. at 13 (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2771). 
332 Id. at 13 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992), explaining that “even where Congress has the authority under the 
Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power to directly compel the States to pass laws requiring or prohibiting 
certain acts, it lacks the power to directly compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”) 
333 Id. at 14 (citing Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 476). 
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was concerned only with what would provide an arresting officer with ‘probable cause of the criminal violation of 
illegal entry.’”334 
Additionally, the Friendly House Court explained that “[u]nder Proposition 200, State and local officials 
are neither required nor authorized to arrest or detain applicants they believe to be in violation of federal 
immigration law.”335 Rather, the Friendly House Court concluded that “[State and local] officials are only required 
to inform federal immigration authorities of immigration violations, something that [State and local officials] are 
already expressly authorized to do under [federal immigration law].”336 
c. FRIENDLY HOUSE DISTINGUISHED FROM LULAC I 
The Friendly House Court specifically addressed and distinguished the LULAC I holding when it analyzed 
whether the first DeCanas test invalidated Proposition 200.  The Friendly House Court stated that “[i]f [they] were 
to follow the decision in [LULAC I] . . . Proposition 200’s verification and reporting provisions would ‘directly 
regulate immigration by creating a comprehensive scheme to detect and report the presence and effect the removal 
of illegal aliens.’”337 The Friendly House Court further remarked that:  
 
[A]s in LULAC I, Proposition 200 requires state and local agents to question all applicants for 
public benefits regarding their immigration status; to obtain and examine documents regarding the 
immigration status of such applicants; and to report to federal immigration authorities any 
violation of federal immigrant law by any such applicant.338 
However, the Friendly House Court determined that LULAC I differed from the present case in several 
ways.  The Friendly House Court pointed out that unlike Proposition 200, Proposition 187 was passed and “LULAC 
I . . . was decided before the enactment of the PRA, thereby distinguishing it from the present case.”339 
Consequently, The Friendly House Court emphasized that “under the PRA, ‘[a] State or political subdivision of a 
State is authorized to require an applicant . . . to provide proof of eligibility.’”340 The Friendly House Court 
reminded that “[n]o such express authorization existed in LULAC I.”341 
The Friendly House Court further distinguished the present case from LULAC I by emphasizing that 
“under the PRA, a State is not required to follow the federal classification criteria in determining the eligibility of 
qualified aliens for public benefits.”342 The Friendly House Court commented that “[r]ather, if [the State] . . . 
follows the federal criteria, a State is only presumed to have chosen the least restrictive means available for 
determining eligibility.”343 The Friendly House Court reminded that “[a]gain, in LULAC I, there was no federal 
statute giving the States such discretion.”344 Consequently, the Friendly House Court distinguished Proposition 187 
from Proposition 200 largely because the PRA did not exist when Proposition 187 was passed, or when LULAC I 
was decided. 
 
d. HOLDING OF THE COURT 
Based on their analysis of Proposition 200, in light of the passage of the PRA, and based on the present 
case being distinguished from LULAC I with respect to applying the first DeCanas test, the Friendly House Court 
held that the first DeCanas test did not preempt any portion of Proposition 200. 
 
334 Id. at 14 (citing Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 476). 
335 Id. at 14. 
336 Id. at 14 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)). 
337 Id. at 11 (citing LULAC I, 908 F.Supp. at 769). 
338 Id. at 11-12 (see generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-140.01). 
339 Id. at 12. 
340 Id. at 12 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1625 (“A State or political subdivision of a State is authorized to require an applicant for State or local benefits (as 
defined in section 1621(c) of this title) to provide proof of eligibility”)). 
341 Id. at 12. 
342 Id. at 12 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7)). 
343 Id. at 12 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7)). 
344 Id. at 12. 
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2. APPLICATION OF THE SECOND DECANAS TEST 
a. THE FRIENDLY HOUSE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE LULAC II 
COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE SECOND DECANAS TEST  
 
The Friendly House Court began the analysis by reminding that “the Constitution commits the power to 
regulate immigration exclusively to the federal government.”345 However, the Friendly House Court also 
determined that “there is no ‘specific indication either in the wording or in the legislative history of the INA that 
Congress intended to preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general.’”346 Still, the 
Friendly House Court asserted that “the federal government, through the INA, ‘has certainly occupied the field for 
formulating the governing definitions and standards for determining a person’s immigration status.’”347 
Consequently, “under the Supremacy Clause, it would be impermissible for state or local officials to classify aliens 
as ‘undocumented’ or ‘illegal’ in a manner that differs than the federal government.”348 
The Friendly House Court referred to LULAC II by explaining that “[a]ccording to the court in LULAC II, 
by enacting the PRA, while there is no explicit declaration in the statute itself, Congress nevertheless manifested its 
clear intent to occupy the field of regulation of government benefits to aliens.”349 The Friendly House Court 
recognized that “[a]s the court explained in LULAC II, ‘[w]hatever the level of government extending the benefits 
and whatever the source of funding for the benefits – federal, state, or local – they are all included within the 
expansive reach of the PRA.’”350 Moreover, the Friendly House Court acknowledged that “[a]ccording to the 
[LULAC II C]ourt ‘[the provisions of the PRA] both demarcate a field of comprehensive federal regulation within 
which states may not legislate, and define federal objectives with which states may not interfere.’”351 Consequently, 
the Friendly House Court also understood that that the LULAC II Court emphasized that “[i]n enacting the PRA, 
Congress explicitly declared that the national immigration policy of the United States is to deny public benefits to all 
but a narrowly defined class of immigrants, with illegal immigrants excluded.”352 Therefore, the Friendly House 
Court understood that “the Court in LULAC II declared that ‘[t]his policy statement concerning the relationship 
between welfare and immigration leaves no doubt that the federal government has taken full control of the field of 
regulation of public benefits to aliens.’”353 
b. THE FRIENDLY HOUSE COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE SECOND DECANAS 
TEST DISTINGUISHED FROM THE HOLDING OF THE LULAC II COURT 
 
The Friendly House Court interpreted and applied the second DeCanas test very differently than the 
LULAC II Court.354 Specifically, the Friendly House Court identified several sections of federal law that they held 
evidenced that Congress did not intend to occupy the field of regulation of public benefits to aliens.  Consequently, 
the Friendly House Court drew different conclusions than the LULAC II Court did. 
For example, the Friendly House Court noted that “with certain exceptions, the PRA authorizes States ‘to 
determine the eligibility for any State public benefits of an alien who is a qualified alien . . . a nonimmigrant . . . or 
an alien who is paroled into the United States . . . for less than one year.’”355 The Friendly House Court remarked 
that “[i]n making such determinations, a State is not required to follow federal standards, but if it does so, it is 
entitled to a presumption of having chosen ‘the least restrictive means’ if it [follows federal standards].”356 The 
Friendly House Court concluded that “Congress would not have vested State and local governments with such 
discretion had it intended to occupy the field.”357 
345 Id. at 15 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354). 
346 Id. at 15 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358). 
347 Id. at 15-16 (citing Merten I, 605 F.Supp.2d at 605 n.20). 
348 Id. at 16 (citing Merten I, 605 F.Supp.2d at 605 n.20). 
349 Id. at 16 (citing LULAC II, 997 F.Supp at 1253, Merten I, 605 F.Supp.2d at 605 (“As a result, it does appear that Congress has preempted the 
field of determining alien eligibility for certain public benefits, including even state benefits.”) 
350 Id. at 16 (citing LULAC II, 997 F.Supp at 1253). 
351 Id. at 16 (citing LULAC II, 997 F.Supp at 1253-54; see generally 8 U.S.C. §§  1601, 1611, 1621, 1621(d), 1642). 
352 Id. at 16 (citing LULAC II, 997 F.Supp at 1254; see generally U.S.C. § 1601). 
353 Id. at 16 (citing LULAC II, 997 F.Supp at 1254). 
354 Id. at 16 (explaining with respect to the LULAC II holding, that “[a] careful reading of both the language and legislative history of the PRA, 
however, leads this Court to a different conclusion.”) 
355 Id. at 16-17 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a)). 
356 Id. at 17 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7)). 
357 Id. at 17. 
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The Friendly House Court also noted that “a State is permitted to ‘provide that an alien who is not lawfully 
present in the United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such alien would otherwise be 
ineligible . . . through enactment of a State law . . . which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”358 The 
Friendly House Court explained that “in other words, through affirmative legislation, a State may exceed the PRA 
and provide state or local public benefits even to illegal aliens.”359 The Friendly House Court concluded that “[t]he 
fact that Congress so empowered States further belies the argument that Congress intended to occupy the field.”360 
Moreover, the Friendly House Court emphasized that “a State ‘is authorized to prohibit or otherwise limit 
or restrict the eligibility aliens or classes of aliens’ for State or local programs of general cash public assistance.”361 
However, the Friendly House Court noted that “[t]his authority is only limited to the extent that any prohibitions, 
limitations, or restrictions are not more restrictive than those imposed under comparable Federal programs.”362
Consequently, the Friendly House Court emphasized that “so long as any such restrictions or limitations comply 
with similar Federal standards, a State is free to set its own standards regarding the eligibility of aliens for general 
cash public assistance.”363 
The Friendly House Court further noted that “with certain enumerated exceptions, ‘in determining the 
eligibility and the amount of benefits of an alien for any State public benefits,’ State and local governments may, at 
their option, provide that the income and resources of the alien be deemed to include the income and resources of the 
alien’s sponsor or spouse.”364 Therefore, the Friendly House Court determined that “by granting State and local 
governments the choice to attribute a sponsor’s income and resources to an alien applying for State public benefits, 
Congress further demonstrated its intent not to occupy the field.”365
Finally, the Friendly House Court contended that “the legislative history of the PRA provides further 
evidence that Congress did not intend to completely occupy the field.”366 To support their contention, the Friendly 
House Court asserted that “in the legislative report regarding the PRA, Congress explicitly determined that ‘[i]t 
grants maximum State flexibility to show true compassion by helping those in need achieve the freedom of self-
reliance.’”367 The Friendly House Court emphasized that “forcing aliens to be self-reliant is the declared national 
policy regarding welfare and immigration.”368 The Friendly House Court concluded that “[h]ad Congress intended 
to completely occupy the field with respect to this national policy, it would not have granted States maximum 
flexibility in furthering that policy.”369 
c. HOLDING OF THE COURT 
 
The Friendly House Court emphasized that “[c]learly, any state statute which purported to regulate State or 
local benefits mandated under Federal law would be preempted.”370 However, the Friendly House Court determined 
that “by its express terms, Proposition 200 does not apply to State or local benefits that are federally mandated.”371 
The Friendly House Court further asserted that the examples identified in the previous section of this article 
illustrate that “it seems clear that Congress intended to stop short of occupying the field regarding the distribution of 
public benefits to aliens, at least with respect to State or local benefits not mandated under Federal law.”372 The 
Friendly House Court contended that “[r]egarding State or local benefits that are not federally mandated, the PRA 
vests States with considerable discretion in determining who is eligible for such benefits . . . .”373 Moreover, the 
Friendly House Court explained that “[States] may even extend such benefits to illegal aliens who would not 
otherwise be eligible.”374 
358 Id. at 17 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d)). 
359 Id. at 17. 
360 Id. at 17. 
361 Id. at 17 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1624(a)). 
362 Id. at 17 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1624(b)). 
363 Id. at 17. 
364 Id. at 17 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1632(a)). 
365 Id. at 17. 
366 Id. at 18. 
367 Id. at 18 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-651, at 3 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2184). 
368 Id. at 18 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1601). 
369 Id. at 18. 
370 Id. at 18. 
371 Id. at 18 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-140.01(A) (“An agency of this state and all of its political subdivisions, including local governments 
that are responsible for the administration of state and local public benefits that are not federally mandated . . . .”) 
372 Id. at 18. 
373 Id. at 18. 
374 Id. at 18. 
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Consequently, the Friendly House Court concluded that “it would not appear that the PRA occupies the 
field that Proposition 200 seeks to regulate.”375 Therefore, the Friendly House Court held that the second DeCanas 
test did not preempt any portion of Proposition 200. 
 
3. APPLICATION OF THE THIRD DECANAS TEST 
The Friendly House Court began its analysis of the Proposition 200 under the third DeCanas test by 
explaining that “under the . . . test, a state statute is preempted if it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purpose of Congress.’”376 The Friendly House Court elaborated by stating that “[p]ut another 
way, Proposition 200 will be preempted if ‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility.’”377
However, the Friendly House Court explained that the Proposition 200 and the PRA are harmonious, and 
that “it is not physically impossible to comply with the Proposition 200 and the PRA.”378 The Friendly House Court 
clarified further that “Proposition 200 deals only with those State and local public benefits that ‘are not federally 
mandated.’”379 Therefore, The Friendly House Court concluded that “Proposition 200 does not touch upon such 
“federally mandated” public benefits . . . .”380 
The Friendly House Court acknowledged that “in implementing Proposition 200, State and local employees 
will need to distinguish between federally mandated public benefits, and those which are authorized under Arizona 
law but not federally mandated.381 The Friendly House Court reasoned that “[w]hile this may require education of 
State and local officials, it does render in physically impossible to comply with both Proposition 200 and the 
PRA.”382 In fact, the Friendly House Court noted that “the task of complying with both laws is made less onerous 
by the fact that Proposition 200, as interpreted by the Arizona Attorney General, applies only to benefits provided 
under Title 46 of the Arizona Revised Statutes.”383 
Consequently, the Friendly House Court determined that Proposition 200 was not preempted, holding that 
“it is not ‘physically impossible’ to comply with [it] and the PRA.”  Therefore, the Friendly House Court found that 
the third DeCanas test did not preempt any portion of the Act. 
 
5. THE FRIENDLY HOUSE COURT’S DECISION 
The Friendly House Court, by determining that no portion of the Act was preempted by the DeCanas tests, 
denied the Plaintiffs’ Application for Preliminary Injunction on December 22, 2004.384 In addition, the Friendly 
House Court also ordered that the District’s Court’s Temporary Restraining Order be lifted that same day.385 
G. THE CURRENT STATUS OF PROPOSITION 200 
Prior to denying the Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction on December 22, 2004, the Friendly 
House Court granted two separate motions to intervene as defendants.386 One group of intervenors includes Kathy 
McKee and Claudia Bloom, statutory officers of PAN (“Protect America Now”).387 PAN was an unincorporated 
committee that arranged to place Proposition 200 on the November 2004 ballot.388 
375 Id. at 18. 
376 Id. at 18 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 363). 
377 Id. at 18-19 (citing Florida Lime & Avacado Growers, 373 U.S., at 142-43). 
378 Id. at 19. 
379 Id. at 19. 
380 Id. at 19 (referring to public elementary education (Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); 8 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(2)); services and assistance related 
to child protection, adult protective services, violence and abuse prevention, and treatment of mental illness or substance abuse (66 Fed. Reg. 
3613, 3616); and assistance for emergency medical treatment, short-term, non-cash, in-kind emergency disaster relief, and public health 
assistance for immunizations (8 U.S.C. § 1621(b)). 
381 Id. at 19 (explaining that “Clearly, under the PRA, this is something State and local officials are already required to do. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1621, 1642.”) 
382 Id. at 19. 
383 Id. at 19. 
384 Id. at 28. 
385 Id. at 28. 
386 Brief of Intervenors-Defendants/Appellees Kathy McGee and Claudia Bloom at 3-4, Friendly House v. Napolitano, CV 04-649 (Ariz. D. 
2004) (No. 05-15005). 
387 Id. at 4. 
388 Id. at 4. 
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The other group of intervenors included one individual (Randy Pullen) and two organizations (Yes on 
Proposition 200, and the Federation for American Immigration Reform, or FAIR) that supported passage of 
Proposition 200.389
After the Friendly House Court, the Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on December 29, 2004.390 The 
Plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for a stay pending their appeal on January 3, 2005.391 However, the 
motions panel denied the Plaintiffs’ emergency motion on January 14, 2005.392 The Plaintiffs proceeded to file their 
opening brief with the Ninth Circuit on January 26, 2005.  In response, the Defendants filed their Answering Brief 
on February 23, 2005.  Furthermore, Intervenors-Defendants/Appellees Kathy Mcgee and Claudia Bloom filed a 
brief on March 7, 2005.   
On August 9, 2005 the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling in which they dismissed the Plaintiffs’ appeal for want 
of jurisdiction.393 The Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]he district court record reveals that there was no case or 
controversy between plaintiffs and the State of Arizona when pleadings went before the district court.”394 More 
specifically, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that “[p]laintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating an injury-in-
fact.”395 Consequently, with respect to the District Court’s order denying the Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary 
injunction, the Ninth Circuit held that “[w]e therefore vacate the order below and remand with instructions to 
dismiss without prejudice.”396 
IV. 
POTENTIAL SCENARIOS WITH RESPECT TO PROPOSITION 200’S ULTIMATE FATE, AND  
ACA 6 AS A STATE MEASURE LIKELY TO WITHSTAND CONSTITUTIONAL  
MUSTER UNDER THE DECANAS TESTS 
 
DeCanas v. Bica, LULAC I, LULAC II, and Friendly House (although the District Court’s holding has 
since been vacated without prejudice by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) each illustrated different ways in which 
the DeCanas tests impacted the state measures that the tests were applied to.  Those cases further demonstrate how 
any or all of the three DeCanas tests may still potentially preempt part or all of Proposition 200.  Therefore, relying 
on DeCanas v. Bica, LULAC I, and LULAC II, I shall examine Proposition 200 and each of the three DeCanas tests 
to determine whether one or more of the tests preempts part or all of Proposition 200.  Doing so shall allow me to 
effectively demonstrate how ABA 6 should be able to withstand constitutional scrutiny under the DeCanas tests. 
 
A. PROPOSITION 200’S ULTIMATE FATE: FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE DECANAS TESTS IN 
POTENTIAL SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION INVOLVING PROPOSITION 200 
In light of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacating the Friendly House Court’s decision on August 9, 
2005, is it uncertain whether Proposition 200’s validity will once again be challenged in the courts.  However, it is 
possible that opponents of Proposition 200 will simply wait until they have standing before attacking the measure’s 
legality.  Therefore, it is still useful to consider how the DeCanas tests may or may not preempt part or all of 
Proposition 200 if its opponents initiate another challenge.  Consequently, I shall examine potential outcomes with 
respect to all three of the DeCanas tests. 
 
1. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST DECANAS TEST 
 
After considering the holdings in DeCanas v. Bica, LULAC I and II, and the Friendly House Court’s denial 
of the Plaintiffs’ Request for a Preliminary Injunction, it seems that the first DeCanas test may or may not preempt 
part or all of Proposition 200 based largely on whether Proposition 200 is or is not determined to be a 
comprehensive scheme that has more than a purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration. 
 
389 Id. at 4. 
390 Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 4, Friendly House v. Napolitano, CV 04-649 (Ariz. D. 2004) (No. 05-15005). 
391 Id. at 4. 
392 Id. at 4. 
393 Order [Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Appeal] at 10234, Friendly House v. Napolitano, CV 04-649 (Ariz. D. 2004) (No. 05-15005). 
394 Id. at 10234-5 (citing San Diego County Gun Rights Comm’n v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996). 
395 Id. at 10235 (the Ninth Circuit further explained that “[a]lthough it is not necessary for a plaintiff to subject himself to actual arrest or 
prosecution in order to establish standing (see, e.g. Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 v. Del Pap, 200 F.3d 614, 617-618 (9th Cir. 1999), a 
plaintiff must at least show a ‘genuine threat of imminent prosecution.” (see San Diego County, 98 F.3d. at 1126. 
396 Id. at 10235. 
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a. REVISITING LULAC I AND DECANAS V. BICA IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITION 200 
1. PURELY SPECULATIVE AND INDIRECT IMPACT ON IMMIGRATION 
The DeCanas v. Bica holding seems to offer support in favor of the first DeCanas test not preempting any 
portion of Proposition 200.  As I indicated earlier in Part III of my article, Justice Brennan emphasized in the 
DeCanas v. Bica majority opinion that “standing alone, the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not 
render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted 
into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”397 Therefore, Proposition 200’s 
proponents can stress that standing alone, and without a greater showing by Proposition 200 opponents, the fact that 
aliens are the subject of Proposition 200 does not render it a regulation of immigration.
Justice Brennan continued by emphasizing that California implemented Section 2805 to strengthen its 
economy by adopting federal standards in imposing criminal sanctions against state employers who knowingly 
employ aliens who have no federal right to employment within the country.398 Justice Brennan further noted that 
even if such local regulation has some purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration, it does not thereby 
become a constitutionally proscribed regulation of immigration that Congress itself would be powerless to authorize 
or approve.399
2. DENIAL OF BENEFITS DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A DETERMINATION OF WHO 
SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE ADMITTED TO THE U.S. 
 
The LULAC I holding also seems to support a finding in favor of the first DeCanas test not preempting any 
portion of Proposition 200.  The LULAC I Court acknowledged that Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions 
might indirectly or directly affect immigration by causing such persons to leave the state, or deterring them from 
entering California in the first place.400 However, as I noted in Part III of this article, such a denial does not amount 
to a “determination of who should or should not be admitted to this country.”401 Therefore, the LULAC I Court 
relied on that analysis as an additional justification for holding that Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions were 
not invalidated by the first DeCanas test.  Consequently, Proposition 200’s proponents can assert that even if 
Proposition 200, like Proposition 187’s denial of benefits provisions, indirectly or directly affects immigration by 
causing such persons to leave Arizona, or deterring them from entering Arizona in the first place, the LULAC I 
holding supports a determination that such a denial does not amount to a “determination of who should or should 
not be admitted to this country” (emphasis added). 
 
3. THE PRA ALLOWS ARIZONA TO REQUIRE APPLICANTS TO PROVIDE PROOF OF 
ELIGIBILITY IN ENFORCING PROPOSITION 200 
 
Proposition 200’s provisions, as with Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions, requires Arizona State 
agents to merely perform ministerial tasks.  Proposition 200’s proponents can point out that Proposition 200 requires 
agencies of the state and all of its local subdivisions to verify the identity of applicants for, and verify that applicants 
are eligible for “state and local public benefits that are not federally mandated.”402 Proposition 200 also requires 
agencies of the state and all of its local subdivisions verify the immigration status of any applicants for “state and 
local public benefits that are not federally mandated.”403 
However, it is worth noting, as Proposition 200 opponents themselves might, that unlike Proposition 187’s 
benefit denial provisions, Proposition 200’s language is silent as to whether Arizona state agents are required to 
verify immigration status by verifying immigration status by assessing federal immigration status information 
through SAVE.404 Consequently, it is unclear whether by verifying as required by Proposition 200, Arizona State 
agents would merely be performing “ministerial tasks”. 
 
397 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355. 
398 Id. at 355-56. 
399 Id. at 355-56. 
400 LULAC I, 908 F.Supp at 770. 
401 Id. at 770 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355)(emphasis added). 
402 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-140.01(A)(1).  
403 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-140.01(A)(2). 
404 In fact, Proposition 187’s language was also silent; however, the LULAC I Court held that performing pursuant to Proposition 187’s benefit 
denial provisions required State agents to verify immigration status by verifying immigration status by assessing federal immigration status 
information through SAVE. 
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It is also significant that the PRA was passed subsequent to the LULAC I holding with respect to 
Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions.  Specifically, the PRA states that “[a] state or political subdivision of a 
State is authorized to require an applicant . . . to provide proof of eligibility.”405 In addition, under the PRA a State 
is not required to follow the federal classification criteria in determining the eligibility of qualified aliens for public 
benefits.406 Rather, if the State follows the federal criteria, a State is merely presumed to have chosen the least 
restrictive means available for determining eligibility.407 Consequently, whether Arizona state agents are or are not 
performing mere “ministerial tasks” by performing pursuant to Proposition 200 seems to be a moot point because 
the PRA has authorized States to require an applicant to provide proof of eligibility whether or not the State follows 
the federal criteria. 
 
b. REVISITING LULAC I AND DECANAS V. BICA IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSITION 200 
1. PROPOSITION 200 HAS A “DIRECT AND SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT” ON 
IMMIGRATION, AND IS THEREFORE A REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION 
 
Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Friendly House Court’s decision, the arguments 
used by the Friendly House Plaintiffs still offers guidance as to future potential arguments against Proposition 200’s 
validity.  For instance, the Friendly House Plaintiffs explained that the LULAC I Court determined that Proposition 
187’s verification, notification and cooperation/notification requirements had a much more than a “purely 
speculative and indirect impact on immigration”.408 The LULAC I Court further emphasized that Proposition 187’s 
verification, notification and cooperation/notification requirements directly regulated immigration by creating a 
comprehensive scheme to detect and report the presence and effect the removal of illegal aliens.409 Consequently, 
the LULAC I Court determined that Proposition 187’s verification, notification and cooperation/notification 
requirements had a direct and substantial impact on immigration.410 Therefore, the LULAC I Court held that the 
first DeCanas test preempted Proposition 187’s verification, notification and cooperation/notification requirements 
as a regulation of immigration. 
The Friendly House Plaintiffs, in their appeal to the Ninth Circuit, asserted be that Proposition 200 
incorporates all of the necessary aspects of an “immigration scheme.”411 Consequently, the Friendly House 
Plaintiffs argued that Proposition 200, as with Proposition 187’s classification, notification, and 
cooperation/reporting provisions, have a “direct and substantial impact on immigration,”412 unlike the statute at issue 
in DeCanas v. Bica.  Therefore, Friendly House Plaintiffs urged that Proposition 200 should be preempted as a 
regulation of immigration. 
Because the Friendly House Plaintiffs’ appeal to the Ninth Circuit was denied because the Plaintiffs lacked 
standing, the merits of this argument were not considered; thus, opponents of Proposition 200 could conceivably 
rely on such an argument in the future in support of the first DeCanas test preempting part or all of Proposition 200.  
Therefore, the first DeCanas test may preempt part or all of Proposition 200 if a court determines that Proposition 
200 directly regulates immigration by creating a comprehensive scheme to detect and report the presence and effect 
the removal of illegal aliens.  Consequently, Proposition 200 may be preempted if it is determined that the measure 
has a “direct and substantial impact on immigration”. 
 
405 8 U.S.C. § 1625 (2000) (“A State or political subdivision of a State is authorized to require an applicant for State or local benefits (as defined 
in section 1621(c) of this title) to provide proof of eligibility”)). 
406 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (2000). 
407 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (2000). 
408 LULAC I, 908 F.Supp at 769 (noting that “the scheme requires state agents to question all arrestees, applicants for medical and social services, 
students, and parents of students about their immigration status; to obtain and examine documents relating to the immigration status of such 
persons; to identify “suspected” “illegal” immigrants in California; to report suspected “illegal” immigrants to state and federal authorities; and to 
instruct people suspected of being in the United States illegally to obtain “legal status” or “leave the country”). 
409 Id. at 769. 
410 Id. at 769. 
411 Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 13, Friendly House v. Napolitano, CV 04-649 (Ariz. D. 2004) (No. 05-15005) (asserting that state and 
local employees are empowered and required – under pain of criminal penalty – to investigate (by verifying immigration status), cooperate in 
investigations (by assisting others in the verification of immigration status), sanction (by, in effect, denying services), and expel individuals (by 
reporting them). 
412 Id. at 13; see also note 134 and LULAC I, 908 F.Supp. at 769 for specific details on how Proposition 187’s classification, notification, and 
cooperation/reporting provisions, have a “direct and substantial impact on immigration”. 
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2. APPLICATION OF THE SECOND DECANAS TEST 
 
Of the three DeCanas tests, I believe that the second DeCanas test elicits the most striking contrast 
between the interpretations of Proposition 200’s proponents and opponents.  The contrasting interpretations were 
based on Congress’ intent to occupy the field of regulation with respect to public benefits to aliens.  Moreover, the 
conflict was evident based on the Friendly House Plaintiffs’ reliance on LULAC II, while the Friendly House Court 
disagreed sharply with LULAC II when they denied the Friendly House Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction. 
Consequently, Proposition 200’s ultimate fate with respect to the second DeCanas test may be determined 
based on which of the two interpretations is more persuasive as to Congress’ intent to occupy the field of regulation 
with respect to public benefits to aliens.  However, Proposition 200’s ultimate fate with respect to the second 
DeCanas test may also depend on which field(s) parts or all of Proposition 200 is held to occupy. 
 
a. DECANAS V. BICA, AND CONGRESS’ ABILITY TO COMPLETELY OCCUPY A FIELD  
Prior to examining the DeCanas v. Bica, LULAC I, II, and Friendly House holdings, it shall be helpful to 
consider the DeCanas v. Bica Court’s holding with respect to Congress’ ability to completely occupy a field.  Justice 
Brennan noted that a state regulation designed to protect vital state interests must give way to paramount federal 
legislation.413 However, Justice Brennan emphasized that such a state regulation would give way to paramount 
federal legislation only where it Congress’ clear and manifest purpose to demonstrate a complete ouster of state 
power, including state power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws.414 Therefore, DeCanas v. Bica 
suggests that part or all of Proposition 200 may be preempted by paramount federal law only where it is Congress’ 
clear and manifest purpose to demonstration a complete ouster of Arizona’s power, including Arizona’s power to 
promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws. 
 
b. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO OCCUPY THE FIELD OF GOVERNMENT BENEFITS TO 
ALIENS? THE FRIENDLY HOUSE PLAINTIFFS AND THE FRIENDLY HOUSE 
COURT’S DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES 
 
The Friendly House Plaintiffs, relying on LULAC II, stressed that whether level of government extending 
benefits, or the source of funding for the benefits (i.e. federal, state, or local), the PRA encompassed all of them.415 
The Friendly House Plaintiffs further buttressed their position by emphasizing that PRA “both demarcate(s) a field 
of comprehensive federal regulation within which states may not legislate, and define federal objectives with which 
states may not interfere.”416 Therefore, it seems the Friendly House Plaintiffs did, and that challengers to 
Proposition 200 could press for a broad interpretation of the PRA, such that it evidences Congress’ intention to 
occupy the entire field of regulation with respect to public benefits to aliens. 
Alternatively, the Friendly House Court, in denying the Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, 
cited several examples within the PRA that indicated just the opposite.  The Friendly House Court’s holding 
appeared to have been based on portions of the PRA that give states the ability to exercise their own discretion with 
respect to determining eligibility for State public benefits.417 Therefore, the Friendly House Court’s holding 
reflected a view that Congress, by giving states limited ability to determine guidelines with respect to state or local 
public benefits, did not intend to entirely occupy the field of field of regulation of public benefits to aliens.  
Furthermore, although the Ninth Circuit vacated the Friendly House Court’s holding, such a holding is not precluded 
in the future should a court reach the same conclusions. 
 
413 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357. 
414 Id. at 357. 
415 LULAC II, 997 F.Supp at 1253 (referring to statements of national policy regarding the denial of public benefits to illegal immigrants (8 
U.S.C. § 1601); rules regarding imminent eligibility for federal, state, and local benefits, including definitions of the benefits covered (i.e. 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621); a description of state legislative options in the area of immigrant eligibility for state and local benefits (8 U.S.C. § 
1621(d)); and a system for verifying immigration status to determine eligibility for benefits and services (8 U.S.C. § 1642)). 
416 Supra note 274, at 16 (citing LULAC II, 997 F.Supp at 1253-54). 
417 See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1622(a), 1601(7), 1621(d), 1624(a), 1624(b), 1632(a), all of which were cited in id. at 16-18. 
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c. DEFINING THE APPLICABLE FIELD: ANAYSIS OF DECANAS V. BICA AND LULAC I 
 
The Friendly House Plaintiffs and Defendants made compelling arguments in support of Congress either 
intending or not intending to occupy the field of regulation of government benefits to aliens.  However, Proposition 
200’s fate with respect to the second DeCanas test may also be based on which field(s) a court believes that 
Proposition 200 seeks to occupy.  DeCanas v. Bica and LULAC I each examines state measures in which part or all 
of the measure was held not to occupy the same field that Congress intended to occupy, and how such portions of a 
state measure were not preempted by the second DeCanas test. 
 
1. DECANAS V. BICA 
The DeCanas v. Bica Court did not define the field in Section 2805 as the broad field of immigration.  
Rather, the LULAC I Court noted that the DeCanas v. Bica Court held that the statute in question touched on the 
narrower field of employment of illegal aliens.418 Consequently, the LULAC I Court further remarked that the 
DeCanas v. Bica Court held that because nothing in the INA indicated congressional intent to preclude state 
regulation touching on the employment of illegal aliens, the second DeCanas test did not preempt the statute at issue 
in DeCanas v. Bica.419
2. LULAC I 
Relying on DeCanas v. Bica, the LULAC I Court held that, by virtue of the fields that certain Proposition 
187 provisions sought to occupy, and because nothing in the INA “unmistakably confirmed” an intent to oust state 
authority in those fields, that those provisions did not seek to occupy the field of immigration regulation.  
Consequently, those provisions were not preempted by the second DeCanas test.  To illustrate my point, I shall 
examine Proposition 187’s benefit denial, and criminal penalties provisions. 
 
a. PROPOSITION 187’S BENEFIT DENIAL PROVISIONS 
The LULAC I Court examined whether Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions sought to occupy the 
field of immigration regulation.  The LULAC I Court held that Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions touched 
the public benefits field, and specifically alien eligibility for public benefits, rather than the field of immigration 
regulation.420 The LULAC I Court, after reviewing the wording and legislative history of the INA, further reasoned 
that nothing in the INA “unmistakably confirmed” an intent to oust state authority to regulate the field of public 
benefits.421 The LULAC I Court, citing DeCanas v. Bica, further reasoned that intent to oust state authority to 
regulate in the public benefits field cannot be “derived from the scope and detail of the INA . . . governing entry and 
stay of aliens”.422 Consequently, the LULAC I Court held that the second DeCanas test did not preempt Proposition 
187’s benefit denial provisions.   
 
b. PROPOSITION 187’S CRIMINAL PENALTIES PROVISIONS 
Furthermore, the LULAC I Court held that Proposition 187’s criminal penalties provisions touched not on 
the field of immigration regulation, but rather the field of criminal law as it relates to false documents.423 Moreover, 
finding that neither Congress nor the INA intended to completely oust state authority to criminize the falsification 
and use of false identification documents, the LULAC I Court held that the second DeCanas test did not preempt 
Proposition 187’s criminal penalties provisions either.424 
418 LULAC I, 908 F.Supp at 776 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356-7). 
419 Id. at 776 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357). 
420 Id. at 776 (emphasis added). 
421 Id. at 776. 
422 Id. at 776 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 359). 
423 Id. at 776 (emphasis added). 
424 Id. at 776. 
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d. HOW THE SCOPE OF THE FIELD IMPACTS PROPOSITION 200’S ULTIMATE FATE 
Friendly House illustrated the potential conflict over whether Congress does or does not intend to occupy 
the field of immigration regulation.  Furthermore, although the Friendly House decision was vacated, a court is not 
prohibited from making the same holding in the future should Proposition 200 be challenged again.  However, nor is 
a court prohibited from holding in a manner consistent with LULAC II should Proposition 200 be challenged in the 
future. 
In addition, the DeCanas v. Bica and LULAC I holdings illustrate how state measures were held to occupy 
fields other than the field of immigration regulation, and thus avoided being preempted by the second DeCanas test.  
Consequently, Proposition 200’s ultimate fate with respect to the second DeCanas may depend on which field 
Proposition 200 is held to occupy, as well as whether Congress intended to occupy that field.   
 
3. APPLICATION OF THE THIRD DECANAS TEST 
 
With respect to the third DeCanas test, Proposition 200’s ultimate fate may rest in large measure upon 
Attorney General Terry Goddard’s Opinion of November 12, 2004, as well as perhaps the LULAC II holding. 
 
a. IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO COMPLY WITH PROPOSITION 200 AND THE PRA 
The Friendly House Court stated that the third DeCanas test only preempts state law where complying with 
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility.425 Consequently, the Friendly House Court, in denying 
the Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, held that it is not physically impossible to comply with both the 
PRA and Proposition 200 because Proposition 200 deals only with those State and local benefits that “are not 
federally mandated”.426 Furthermore, the Friendly House Court went so far as to assert that Proposition 200 and the 
PRA were “harmonious”.427 The Friendly House Court’s relied, as the basis of Proposition 200’s scope, Attorney 
General Terry Goddard’s Opinion (i.e. the programs subject to Proposition 200 are those within Title 46 of the 
Arizona Revised Statutes that are also subject to the eligibility restrictions in 8 U.S.C. § 1621).428 Consequently, the 
Friendly House Court held that the third DeCanas test did not preempt part or all of Proposition 200.   
 
b. AMBIGUITY IN PROPOSITION 200’S LANGUAGE, AND THE LULAC II HOLDING 
COULD RESULT IN THE THIRD DECANAS TEST PREEMPTING PROPOSITION 200 
 
Despite the Friendly House Court’s holding, it is significant that, as the Legislative Council emphasized, 
and as Goddard himself stated in his Opinion, Proposition 200 did not define the meaning of “state and local public 
benefits that are not federally mandated.”429 In fact, because Proposition 200’s language is silent as to its meaning, 
the scope of “state and local benefits that are not federally mandated” seems to be an open question.  In fact, its 
meaning is currently being litigated among proponents of Proposition 200 in the Arizona State Courts.430 More 
significant, however, is that as the Friendly House Court reminded, “[t]he Attorney General’s opinion, while entitled 
to respect, is advisory only and non-binding.”431 Therefore, opponents of Proposition 200 could assert that the scope 
of “state and local public benefits that are not federally mandated” is ambiguous within Proposition 200’s language, 
so much so that Proposition 200’s supporters are contesting its scope.  Moreover, opponents of Proposition 200 
could also contend that the scope suggested by the Arizona Attorney General and which was relied upon by the 
Friendly House Court is advisory only, and not binding. 
Consequently, opponents of Proposition 200 may be able to rely on the LULAC II Court’s reasoning to 
preempt at least part or all of Proposition 200 with respect to the third DeCanas test.  The LULAC II Court, in 
examining Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions in Sections 5 and 6, noted that by denying public social 
services and health benefits to “alien[s] who are in the United States in violation of federal law”, Proposition 187 
 
425 Supra note 274, at 19 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142-3). 
426 Id. at 19. 
427 Id. at 19. 
428 See generally supra note 277. 
429 Supra note 274, at 5 (explaining that “[i]n its analysis, Legislative Council advised voters that ‘Proposition 200 does not define the term ‘state 
and local public benefits that are not federally mandated.’’”) 
430 See generally supra note 289. 
431 Supra note 274, at 7 n.2. 
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applied standards different than the PRA.432 Specifically, the LULAC II Court noted that Proposition 187’s benefit 
denial provisions in Sections 5 and 6 applied different standards than either the PRA’s standards with respect to 
federal benefits to aliens,433 as well as the PRA’s standards with respect to state and local benefits to aliens.434 
The differences in standards were significant because the LULAC II Court also held that the differences in 
the standards amounted to a conflict between Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions in Sections 5 and 6 and the 
PRA’s classifications.435 The LULAC II Court further held that the conflict between Proposition 187’s benefit 
denial provisions in Sections 5 and 6 and the PRA’s classifications made it impossible to comply with both laws.436 
Consequently, the LULAC II Court held that the third DeCanas test preempted Proposition 187’s benefit denial 
provisions in Sections 5 and 6. 
Therefore, Proposition 200 risks being preempted by the third DeCanas test in two significant ways.  First, 
Proposition 200’s scope, as applied by the Friendly House Court, is non-binding on subsequent courts, potentially 
leaving “state and local benefits that are not federally mandated” undefined by the language Proposition 200.  
Consequently, a subsequent court applying the LULAC II Court’s analysis with respect to the third DeCanas test 
could preempt part or all of Proposition 200 by finding that “state and local benefits that are not federally mandated” 
is a different standard than the PRA’s standards with respect to state and local benefits to aliens.  Consequently, such 
a court could find that differences would result in a conflict, and that the conflict in turn would make it impossible to 
comply with both laws.  Therefore, Proposition 200 could be preempted in part or in whole just as Proposition 187 
was by the LULAC II Court. 
 
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS REGARDING PROPOSITION 200 
 
I have just elaborated on how part or all of Proposition 200 may possibly be preempted by one or more of 
the DeCanas tests.  Although the Friendly House Court’s holding was vacated, and although Proposition 200 may 
not be opposed again in the courts, examining possible outcomes in the event that Proposition 200 is challenged in 
the future served a useful purpose by contrasting Proposition 187 and Proposition 200.  Examining the possible 
outcomes also shed light on some potential weaknesses that may be evident if opponents again challenge 
Proposition 200’s validity.  Consequently, analyzing the possible outcomes shall provide a context in which to 
examine ABA 6’s ability to withstand constitutional scrutiny under the DeCanas tests. 
 
B. ACA 6: THE PROTOTYPE FOR STATE MEASURES SEEKING TO DETER UNDOCUMENTED 
IMMIGRATION, AND WITHSTAND CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY UNDER DECANAS  
 
Mark Wyland, a Republican member of the California Assembly from Del Mar, attempted to amend the 
California State Constitution with ACA 6.  Specifically, Wyland sought to add the following language to Article XX 
of the California State Constitution, and I shall limit my analysis of ACA 6 to this language (which I shall refer to as 
“ACA 6” for the remainder of this article):437 
The state shall not . . . provide any health, special, or other state or local public benefit as defined 
pursuant to subsection (c) of Title 8 of Section 1621 of the United States Code, to a person who is 
neither a citizen of the United States nor an alien lawfully present in the United States, except to 
the extent that a privilege, service, or benefit encompassed by this subdivision is required, 
pursuant to federal law, to be provided.438 
432 LULAC II, 997 F.Supp at 1256. 
433 Id. at 1256 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (i.e. to those who are not “qualified”))(emphasis added). 
434 Id. at 1256 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (i.e. to those who are not “qualified”, to non-immigrants under the PRA, or to aliens who are paroled 
into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of the INA for less than one year))(emphasis added). 
435 Id. at 1257 (emphasis added). 
436 Id. at 1257 (emphasis added). 
437 At the present time, ACA 6 is not being considered.  Therefore, by referring to ACA 6’s language as “ACA 6”, I am referring only to the 
language that I have identified, in whatever form that language may be utilized in the future (i.e. as with a ballot initiative or otherwise); 
consequently, I am not referring to any existing movement to amend the California Constitution using ACA 6’s language. 
438 The wording is a portion of language that Mr. Wyland sought to have added Section 26(a) to Article XX (the full language of Section 26 
would have read “The State shall not issue any driver’s license or state identification card, subsidize in-state tuition or fees for postesecondary 
education, grant any privilege, or provide any health, special, or other state or local public benefit as defined pursuant to subsection (c) of Title 8 
of Section 1621 of the United States Code, to a person who is neither a citizen of the United States nor an alien lawfully present in the United 
States, except to the extent that a privilege, service, or benefit encompassed by this subdivision is required, pursuant to federal law, to be 
provided”, at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/aca _6_bill_20050628_amended_asm… (July 7, 2005). 
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However, the Judiciary Committee voted down the amendment on July 5, 2005.439 Still, Wyland said 
“there would be efforts to put their proposals on the ballot [in 2006] as an initiative.”440 However, even if ACA 6’s 
language is introduced and passed as a voter initiative in 2006, ACA 6 would still need to satisfy all three of the 
DeCanas tests in order for all of ACA 6 to avoid being preempted.  Opponents of ACA 6 have already opposed the 
measure relying in part on DeCanas v. Bica.441 Therefore, I shall examine how ACA 6 will likely withstand 
constitutional scrutiny under the DeCanas tests. 
 
1. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST DECANAS TEST 
ACA 6’s authors, because of the way that ACA 6 was drafted, have better enabled the measure to withstand 
scrutiny under the first DeCanas test than Proposition 187 or Proposition 200.  For example, when compared with 
Proposition 187 and Proposition 200, ACA 6 is not as specific in terms of what State Agents are required to do.  
Instead, ACA 6’s language only states that: 
 
The state shall not . . . provide any health, special, or other state or local public benefit as defined 
pursuant to subsection (c) of Title 8 of Section 1621 of the United States Code, to a person who is 
neither a citizen of the United States nor an alien lawfully present in the United States, except to 
the extent that a privilege, service, or benefit encompassed by this subdivision is required, 
pursuant to federal law, to be provided.  
 
By not providing the same degree of detail in its language, ACA 6’s authors may manage to dodge attacks 
that Proposition 187’s opponents levied at Proposition 187, and that the Friendly House Plaintiffs levied against 
Proposition 200.  I shall examine the attacks that I am referring to by briefly analyzing LULAC I with respect to 
Proposition 187’s verification, notification and cooperation/notification requirements; and the Friendly House 
Plaintiffs’ arguments.   
 
a. LULAC I 
With respect to Proposition 187, the LULAC I Court determined that Proposition 187’s verification, 
notification and cooperation/notification requirements had much more than a “purely speculative and indirect impact 
on immigration.”  The LULAC I Court listed the following activities required by Proposition 187’s verification, 
notification and cooperation/notification requirements in justification of their holding: State agents were required to 
question all arrestees, applicants for medical and social services, students, and parents of students about their 
immigration status; to obtain and examine documents relating to the immigration status of such persons; to identify 
“suspected” “illegal” immigrants in California; to report suspected “illegal” immigrants to state and federal 
authorities; and to instruct people suspected of being in the United States illegally to obtain “legal status” or “leave 
the country.  Consequently, the LULAC I Court was able to draw their conclusions based on the specific 
requirements listed in the language of Proposition 187’s verification, notification and cooperation/notification 
requirements.  Thus, the LULAC I Court held that the verification, notification and cooperation/notification 
requirements directly regulated immigration by creating a comprehensive scheme to detect and report the presence 
and effect the removal of illegal aliens.  Therefore, the LULAC I Court held that the verification, notification and 
cooperation/notification requirements had a direct and substantial impact on immigration. 
 
b. ARGUMENTS OF THE FRIENDLY HOUSE PLAINTIFFS 
As for Proposition 200, the Friendly House Plaintiffs asserted that Proposition 200 represents an 
“immigration scheme” by stressing that that state and local employees are empowered and required – under pain of 
criminal penalty – to investigate (by verifying immigration status), cooperate in investigations (by assisting others in 
the verification of immigration status), sanction (by, in effect, denying services), and expel individuals (by reporting 
 
439 Steve Lawrence, Two Immigration Measures Halted, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 6, 2005 at A4, (referring to a 4-2 party line vote, although 
the author did not indicate which party those who supported ACA 6 belonged to, nor which party those opposed to ACA 6 belonged to). 
440 Id. at A4. 
441 Hearing on a Constitutional Amendment to Bar Public Benefits to Undocumented Immigrants Before the Assembly Committee on Judiciary,
2005 Leg. (2005) (stating that “[o]pponents argue that [ACA 6] violates . . . the Supremacy Clause, by stepping on ground preempted by federal 
immigration law . . . opponents cite [LULAC I and] DeCanas v. Bica . . . .”, at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/aca 
_6_cfa_20050701_151402_asm_… (July 7, 2005). 
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them). Consequently, the Friendly House Plaintiffs reasoned that Proposition 200, as with Proposition 187’s 
classification, notification, and cooperation/reporting provisions, have a “direct and substantial impact on 
immigration”, and therefore that Proposition 200 should be preempted as a regulation of immigration. 
 
c. IMPACT OF LULAC I, AND OF THE FRIENDLY HOUSE PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENTS 
The LULAC I holding and Friendly House Plaintiffs’ arguments underscores that where a state statute (as 
demonstrated by what State agents are required to do to enforce the provisions of the state statute according to the 
language of the statute) has a direct and substantial impact on immigration, such a state statute is a regulation of 
immigration by virtue of the state statute being a comprehensive scheme to detect and report the removal of illegal 
aliens.   
 
d. WHY FIRST DECANAS TEST WILL BE NOT PREEMPT ACA 6 
It is necessary to consider DeCanas v. Bica’s language, which held that if a local regulation has some 
purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration, it does not thereby become a constitutionally proscribed 
regulation of immigration.  The meaning of “purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration”, as used by the 
DeCanas v. Bica Court, is vague, and it is worth noting that the LULAC I Court, by examining what State agents 
were required to do by Proposition 187’s verification, notification and cooperation/notification requirements, 
concluded that such requirements had a direct and substantial impact on immigration.   
However, the DeCanas v. Bica Court did not hold that state measures of the scope of Proposition 187’s 
verification, notification and cooperation/notification requirements had more than a purely speculative and indirect 
impact on immigration.  Consequently, the LULAC I Court’s holding is no guarantee that a court considering ACA 
6 would rely upon the LULAC I Court’s reasoning in determining if ACA 6, as with Proposition 187’s verification, 
notification and cooperation/notification requirements, had more than a purely speculative and indirect impact on 
immigration as required by DeCanas v. Bica.  In fact, a count may be able to determine that ACA 6 has as much of 
an impact on immigration as Proposition 187’s verification, notification and cooperation/notification requirements, 
and still have a purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration as intended by DeCanas v. Bica.  In other 
words, a court considering ACA 6’s impact on immigration is not bound to utilize LULAC I’s “direct and 
substantial impact on immigration” standard when determining whether ACA 6 might have more than a “purely 
speculative and indirect impact on immigration” as intended by DeCanas v. Bica. 
In addition, ACA 6’s language does not have the degree of detail with respect to what state agents are 
required to do to act pursuant to ACA 6 that either Proposition 187 or Proposition 200 had.  Such detail gave 
opponents of Proposition 187 and Proposition 200 ammunition to use in arguing that each measure was a regulatory 
scheme that has a direct and substantial impact on immigration.  However, ACA 6 gives potential opponents no such 
information with respect to what state agents are required to do pursuant to ACA 6 for use in arguing that ACA 6 is 
a regulatory scheme that has a direct and substantial impact on immigration.  Therefore, ACA 6 is less likely to be 
preempted by the first DeCanas test in a manner that Proposition 187’s verification, notification and 
cooperation/notification requirements were, and in which part or all of Proposition 200 might be preempted. 
As I indicated in Part III of this article, the DeCanas v. Bica Court specified that “standing alone, the fact 
that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a 
determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal 
entrant may remain.”442 In the event that APA 6’s opponents are unable to demonstrate that ACA 6 would have 
more than a purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration by showing that ACA 6 is a regulatory scheme, 
then the fact that aliens are the subject of ACA 6 would effectively be left standing alone.  Consequently, ACA 6 
would not be rendered a regulation of immigration on that basis alone.  Furthermore, the language of ACA 6 is not a 
determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal 
entrant may remain; rather, ACA 6 merely identifies a group of persons who shall not receive state or local public 
benefits pursuant to ACA 6.  Therefore, it is less likely that the first DeCanas test will preempt part or all of ACA 6. 
 
2. APPLICATION OF THE SECOND DECANAS TEST 
I believe that ACA 6’s authors, by way of the manner in which they drafted ACA 6, placed themselves in 
as good a position as possible to avoid being preempted by the second DeCanas test.  However, whether the second 
 
442 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355. 
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DeCanas test does or does not preempt part or all of ACA 6 will depend almost entirely on a court’s interpretation 
of the holdings in DeCanas v. Bica, LULAC I, LULAC II, and Friendly House, rather than ACA 6’S language.  
Those prior holdings are important because they will likely provide the framework for determining which field(s) a 
court determining ACA 6’s validity seeks to occupy.  
 
a. ACA 6 SEEKS TO OCCUPY THE FIELD OF IMMIGRATION REGUALTION 
For example, it is possible that, as with LULAC II and Friendly House, a court determining ACA 6’s 
validity may determine that ACA 6 seeks to occupy the field of immigration regulation of public benefits to aliens.  
Consequently ACA 6’s fate, as with Proposition 200’s in Friendly House, would be based on whether Congress 
either did or did not seek to occupy the field of immigration regulation of public benefits to aliens themselves.  
Although the Ninth Circuit vacated Friendly House Court’s holding, another court determining ACA 6’s validity is 
not prohibited from making the same determination as to Congress not occupying the field of immigration 
regulation of public benefits to aliens.  However, because such a holding would be at odds with the LULAC II 
Court’s determination that Congress did seek to entire occupy the field of immigration regulation of public benefits 
to aliens, the question of whether Congress does or does not seek to occupy the field of immigration regulation 
entirely remains an open question. 
It is worth noting however that the LULAC II and Friendly House cases were each decided after the PRA 
was enacted, and that the courts in each of the disputes determined that the state sought to occupy the field that 
Congress also sought to occupy.  It is also noteworthy that the LULAC II Court held that Proposition 187’s benefit 
denial provisions, which the LULAC I Court found to occupy the public benefits field, and specifically alien 
eligibility for public benefits, instead occupied the field of immigration regulation.  Consequently, LULAC II and 
Friendly House may illustrate a trend in which courts determine that by virtue of the PRA, Congress will or will not 
occupy a field that a state implementing a measure designed to deter illegal immigration also occupies.  Under such 
circumstances, the dispute may be based on the LULAC II/Friendly House interpretations of whether Congress does 
or does not occupy the field of immigration regulation, rather than over whether the state statute may possibly 
occupy a field that Congress does not occupy.443 
b. ACA 6 SEEKS TO OCCUPY THE FIELD OTHER THAN IMMIGRATION REGUALTION 
It is also possible that a court considering ACA 6’s validity may still determine that ACA 6 occupies a field 
other than immigration regulation.  The DeCanas v. Bica Court did exactly that when it determined that Section 
2805 did not seek to occupy the field of immigration, but rather that Section 2805 touched on the narrower field of 
employment of illegal aliens, a field that Congress did not seek to occupy. Consequently, the second DeCanas test 
did not preempt Section 2805(a).  Relying on DeCanas v. Bica, the LULAC I Court held that Proposition 187’s 
benefit denial provisions touched the public benefits field, and specifically alien eligibility for public benefits,
another field that Congress did not occupy, rather than the field of immigration regulation.  Consequently, the 
second DeCanas test did not preempt Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions as decided by the LULAC I Court. 
When compared to Section 2805 and Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions, ACA 6 seems to 
resemble Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions more closely.  Therefore, if a court considering ACA 6’s 
validity utilizes the DeCanas v. Bica and LULAC I Courts’ reasoning, the second DeCanas test will likely not 
preempt ACA 6 if it is determined that ACA 6 occupies the public benefits field, and specifically alien eligibility for 
public benefits, rather than the field of immigration regulation.  
 
3. APPLICATION OF THE THIRD DECANAS TEST 
The ACA 6’s drafters seem to have gone to some lengths to avoid one of Proposition 187’s actual, and one 
of Proposition 200’s potential weaknesses.  With respect to Proposition 187, the LULAC II Court made a point of 
commenting on Proposition 187’s “poor draftsmanship” as the cause of the conflict between the measure’s benefit 
denial provisions and federal law.444 Moreover, by not defining the meaning of “state and local public benefits that 
 
443 In other words, a court would determine that the state occupies the field of immigration regulation, and the dispute would be based on whether 
Congress also sought to occupy the field; such analysis is contrasted with DeCanas v. Bica and LULAC I, in which the courts determined that the 
states occupied fields other than immigration regulation, fields that Congress did not also occupy. 
444 LULAC II, 997 F.Supp at 13 n.14 (explaining that “[t]he difference between the classification scheme in [S]ections 5 and 6 and the 
classification scheme in [S]ections 7 and 8 is an example of the Proposition’s poor draftsmanship.  Sections 5 and 6 refer to a “citizen of the 
United States,”, an “alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident,” an “alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time” and an “alien in 
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are not federally mandated”, a court following the LULAC II Court’s holding may conclude that Proposition 200 
applies a different standard than the PRA’s standards with respect to state and local benefits to aliens.  
Consequently, because such a court could find that the differences between Proposition 200 and the PRA would 
result in a conflict, and that the conflict would make it impossible to comply with both laws, Proposition 200 could 
be preempted in part or in whole on that basis.  Therefore, the third DeCanas test may preempt Proposition 200 in 
part or entirely because of ambiguity in its language, and lack of specificity in its scope. 
 
a. ACA 6’S EXPLICIT LANGUAGE AND CONCISE STANDARD AVOIDS AMBUIGUITY 
THAT MIGHT RESULT IN A CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL LAW 
 
However, by explicitly defining any “state or local public benefit as defined pursuant to subsection (c) of 
Title 8 of Section 1621”, ACA 6 avoids Proposition 200’s potential problems.  First, by explicitly referencing 
Section 1621(c) of Title 8, ACA 6’s drafters avoided the uncertainty of having the meaning of “state or local public 
benefits” rely on something similar to the opinion of the Arizona Attorney General (as with Proposition 200).  
Rather, ACA 6’s language with respect to state or local public benefits is clear.  Moreover, ACA 6 lists one clear 
standard, as opposed to the multiple definitions offered by Proposition 187’s drafters.  Consequently, there are fewer 
bases in which ACA 6 might conflict with federal law than with Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions. 
 
b. ACA 6’S EXPLICIT LANGUAGE REFERENCES THE PRA’S VERY OWN STANDARD  
Furthermore, ACA 6 references the PRA’s very own standard as it pertains to state or local benefits.  Such 
precise drafting seems to undermine, if not preempt altogether arguments by opponents of ACA 6 that there is a 
conflict between ACA 6’s classification of “state or local public benefits” and the PRA.  Thus, opponents of ACA 6 
are unlikely to successfully further demonstrate that such a conflict would make it impossible to comply with both 
the terms of the PRA and also ACA 6.  Therefore, unlike Proposition 187’s benefit denial provisions in Sections 5 
and 6, a court determining ACA 6’s validity is unlikely to find a conflict between the ACA 6 and federal standards, 
such that compliance with both standards is impossible.  Consequently, it is unlikely that the third DeCanas test 
would preempt ACA 6. 
 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The Valenzuelas and undocumented immigrants represent not just a group of persons with supporters and 
detractors, but they embody an issue so complex that even our two major political parties are conflicted about how 
to properly address it.  What is clear is that undocumented immigration has prompted states to enact measures 
designed to deter it.  It is also clear that such a state measure must withstand scrutiny under each of the DeCanas 
tests in order for the state measure to avoid being preempted in part of in whole by federal law. 
What is less clear is how courts, even after examining DeCanas v. Bica, LULAC I, LULAC II, and 
Friendly House, will apply the DeCanas tests in determining whether such state measures are or are not preempted 
by federal law.  However, based on an examination of DeCanas v. Bica, LULAC I, LULAC II, and Friendly House, 
and an analysis of Proposition 187, Proposition 200 and ACA 6, ACA 6 seems to have been drafted in a manner that 
will allow it to withstand scrutiny under the DeCanas tests.  Consequently, by virtue of being specific enough to 
avoid being preempted, and yet not so detailed that it is likely to be preempted, ACA 6 represents an example of 
state measure designed to deter undocumented immigration likely to withstand scrutiny under the DeCanas tests. 
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